

# **PREDICATES AND OBJECTIONS**

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Chapter 21 on *Business Interests* in Bancroft-Whitney's TEXAS FAMILY LAW SERVICE (Speer's 6th ed.)

13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 477, *Fitting a Round Peg Into A Square Hole: Section 3.63, Texas Family Code, and the Marriage that Crosses States Lines*-1982

39 BAY. L. REV. 909, *Characterization of Marital Property*-1988 (co-authored)

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**State Bar's Advanced Appellate Course**

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## PREDICATES AND OBJECTIONS<sup>o</sup>

By

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**I. SCOPE OF ARTICLE.** This Article discusses predicates and objections for evidence in civil litigation in Texas courts. Topics include types of admissible evidence, proper ways to elicit testimony, meeting predicates for admission of evidence, using demonstrative aids, making evidentiary objections, and preserving the right to complain on appeal about the trial court's evidentiary rulings.

**II. INTRODUCTION.** In this Article, TRCE = Texas Rules of Civil Evidence (superceded on March 1, 1998); TRE = Texas Rules of Evidence (effective on March 1, 1998); TRAP = Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (we have new TRAPs effective September 1, 1997); and TCP&RC = Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Topics are presented in an arbitrary order, so the reader should either scan through the table of contents or do significant word searches if the article is in digital form.

The new Texas Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals. They became effective on March 1, 1998.

New TRAPs became effective on September 1, 1997. The changes do not affect evidence at the trial level.

**III. AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENT (GENERALLY).** No evidence is admissible unless it has been authenticated. This authentication requirement is met by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. TRCE 901. Typical forms of authentication are by testimony of a witness with knowledge, lay opinion on genuineness of handwriting, identification of a voice by someone who has heard the speaker speak, etc. TRCE 901(b).

Some documents are self-authenticated: domestic government documents under seal, or if not under seal then attested to under seal by a public officer that the signer had the capacity and the signature is genuine; foreign public documents which are attested and certified as genuine; certified copies of public records; official publications; newspapers and periodicals; trade inscriptions showing ownership, control or origin; acknowledged documents; commercial paper; and business records accompanied by "business records affidavit." TRCE 902 ("Self-Authentication").

It should be noted that merely authenticating a document does not guarantee its admissibility. See *Wright v. Lewis*, 777 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (despite the fact that

a letter was authenticated, the letter was not admissible because of the hearsay rule).

**IV. BEST EVIDENCE RULE.** The "best evidence rule" provides that ordinarily you must use the original writing, recording or photograph to prove the contents of that writing, recording or photograph. The rule governs (i) the use of copies, and (ii) the use of oral testimony to prove the contents of a writing. TRCE 1002. A duplicate may be used unless (1) a question is raised as to the authenticity of the duplicate, or (2) the use of the duplicate under the circumstances would be unfair. TRCE 1003. An original is not required if: the original has been lost or destroyed (except by the offering party in bad faith), or the original cannot be obtained, or no original is in Texas, or the opponent, after having been put on notice of the need for the original, does not produce it. Also, the original is not required if the item relates only to collateral matters. TRCE 1004.

Public Records. The contents of public records can be proved by a certified copy (see TRCE 902), or a copy authenticated by the testimony of any witness who has compared the copy to the original. TRCE 1005. Only if neither of these sources is available can other evidence of contents can be given. TRCE 1005.

Business Records. Copies of business records can be authenticated by the testimony of the custodian of the records or other qualified witness. See TRCE 803(6). Authentication can also be done by affidavit, as provided in TRCE 902(10). Computer records have a specific provision: TRCE 1001(3) provides that "[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar device, any print-out or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'original'."

Summaries. The use of a summary would violate the best evidence rule. TRCE 1006 creates an exception to the best evidence rule, for summaries. Under TRCE 1006, a summary of the contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs, is admissible where those underlying items cannot be conveniently examined in court, and the underlying items are themselves admissible. However, the underlying items, or duplicates of them, must be made available to the opposing party, to examine or copy at a reasonable time and place. The court can order that the underlying items be produced in court. See *Aquamarine Assoc. v. Burton Shipyard, Inc.*, 659 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1983). If the underlying records are in evidence, the court can exclude the summaries as being cumulative. *Parker v. Miller*, 860 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

Cases. See *Ford Motor Company v. Auto Supply Company, Inc.*, 661 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir.1981) (trial court properly admitted into evidence product line profitability analyses made annually and compiled from

numerous "spread sheets"); *Rosenberg v. Collins*, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.1980) (trial court properly admitted a summary of the commodity firm's yearly trading activities); *Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Construction Co., Inc.*, 538 S.W.2d 80, 92 (Tex.1976) (a proper predicate, as business records, must be laid for the admission of the underlying records used to prepare a summary); *Curran v. Unis*, 711 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, no writ) (income tax returns are an annual summary of the profitability of the business); *c.f. McAllen State Bank v. Linbeck Construction Corp.*, 695 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex.App.--CorpusChristi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court admitted into evidence two computer printout summary breakdowns, each a summary of underlying labor and material records; the court held that the printouts were entitled to be treated as business records, and not just as summaries of business records).

If the underlying records are government records or business records, they must be properly authenticated before summaries of those records would be admissible. If the underlying records are hearsay, or contain hearsay, then the summary is admissible only if hearsay exceptions are met.

**V. THE HEARSAY RULE.** Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." TRCE 801(d). By special definition, a "prior statement by witness," "admission of a party-opponent," and "depositions" in the same case are not hearsay. TRCE 801(e). A "statement" is (i) an oral or written verbal expression or (ii) nonverbal conduct of a person that is intended to substitute for a verbal expression. TRCE 801(a). A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. TRCE 801(b).

**VI. HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY.** TRCE 805 provides that hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. In *Alvarez v. Burke*, 827 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, writ denied), the court admitted an excited utterance within an excited utterance. Another example would be medical records, proved up by the hospital's custodian of the records under TRCE 803(6). The medical records may meet the business-record exception to the hearsay rule, but hearsay contained in the medical records must meet an exception to the hearsay rule, or that hearsay must be redacted from the records. An example would be medical records containing statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, which is an exception to the hearsay rule under TRCE 803(4).

**VII. OFFER FOR LIMITED PURPOSE.** Limited admissibility is covered in TRCE 105. The rule arises when evidence is admissible for some purposes but not others, or admissible against some parties but not all

parties. Where evidence is admissible for some purposes, but not generally, and the offer of the evidence is made generally, without limitation as to its use, the trial court should exclude the evidence. If the offer is made generally, opposing counsel should object to its admissibility on appropriate grounds. If the objection is sustained, the proponent should re-offer the evidence "for a limited purpose." If accepted by the trial court for a limited purpose, the opponent should move the court for a limiting instruction, whereby the court would instruct the jury that it can consider that evidence only for a limited purpose, and no other. *Larson v. Cactus Utility Co.*, 730 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1987) ("Where tendered evidence should be considered for only one purpose, it is the opponent's burden to secure a limiting instruction"). If the opposing party does not seek such a limiting instruction, the evidence is received for all purposes, even if it was offered only for a limited purpose. *Cigna Ins. Co. v. Evans*, 847 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, no writ) (where document was read into evidence without a limiting instruction, it was in evidence for all purposes); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry*, 833 S.W.2d 587, 595 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (party could not complain that excluded evidence met state-of-mind exception to hearsay rule when the party made only a general offer of the evidence, and not an offer for the limited purpose of showing state-of-mind). See *Texas Commerce Bank v. Lebco Constructors, Inc.*, 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (evidence admitted for the limited purpose of punitive damages could not be used on appeal to support the verdict on actual damages).

The sequence is as follows:

Proponent offers hearsay for all purposes.

Opponent objects based on hearsay; objection is sustained.

Proponent reoffers the hearsay for limited purpose.

Opponent renews hearsay objection.

Court overrules hearsay objection.

Opponent requests limiting instruction.

**VIII. STATE OF MIND EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE.** TRCE 803(3) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of the declarant's then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, except where offered to prove the fact remembered or believed, unless such fact relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant's will. Under the Rule, the comment must relate to a then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, not a prior one. Included would be intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health. The

exception ordinarily does not permit the admission of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. Such an offer will, therefore, ordinarily be for a limited purpose.

TRCE 803(3) finds frequent use in family law cases involving children. In *Huber v. Buder*, 434 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a witness was permitted to relate what three children said about which parent they wanted to live with. *Accord, Melton v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit*, 602 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1980, no writ), which held that a child's preference on custody fits the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. In *Ochs v. Martinez*, 789 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, writ denied), out-of-court statements by a girl regarding sexual abuse by her step-father were inadmissible since they related to past external facts or conditions rather than present state of mind. In *Posner v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit*, 784 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1990, writ denied), an adult was permitted to relate a comment she overheard a child make regarding sexual abuse. In *Baxter v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources*, 678 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.--Austin 1984, no writ), a witness was permitted to relate a child's statements that he had been beaten and was afraid of more beatings, and further that he had seen his parents' pornographic materials. In *James v. Tex. Dept. Hum. Resources*, 836 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992, no writ), statements by the children indicating that they had been sexually abused did not meet the state of mind exception.

See generally *Chandler v. Chandler*, 842 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1992, writ denied), involving a husband's allegation that the wife had defrauded him into thinking that her prior Mexican marriage had been dissolved by a Mexican divorce. The court said that it was not error to permit the wife to testify that a Mexican judge had pronounced her divorced from her first husband, since the information was offered to show the wife's state of mind--not the truth of the matter stated, and also because testimony is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the credibility or competency of some person other than the person by whom it is sought to be produced, and the competency or credibility of the Mexican judge was not in issue. The Court went on to say that the evidence was admissible to show wife's state of mind, as regards whether she defrauded husband about the termination of her prior marriage.

Where evidence is excluded on the ground of hearsay, and the proponent wishes to meet the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must reoffer the evidence for the limited purpose of showing state of mind. Absent such a limited offer, the proponent cannot argue on appeal that the evidence was admissible under this hearsay exception. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.*

*Berry*, 833 S.W.2d 587, 595 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992, writ denied).

See generally *Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat. Bank*, 668 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. 1987) (witness cannot testify as to the state of mind of another person).

**IX. GOVERNMENT RECORDS.** Government records are called "public records and reports" in the TRCE. The term "public records and reports" includes "records, reports, statements, or data compilations of public offices or agencies," which set forth "(A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, or (C) factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law." TRCE 803(8). Another category of government records is records of vital statistics. TRCE 803(9).

**A. Authentication of Government Records.** Recognized methods of authenticating government records include: proof that a public record, report, statement, or data compilation, authorized by law to be recorded and filed, and which was recorded or filed in a public office, is from that office (TRCE 901(b)(7)); domestic public documents under seal, which are self-authenticating; domestic public documents not under seal, where a public officer with a seal has certified under seal that the signer has official capacity and that the signature is genuine, which are self-authenticating (TRCE 902(2)); foreign public documents accompanied by a final certification, which are self-authenticating (TRCE 902(3)); and copies certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification (TRCE 902(4)). A copy of a government record can be authenticated by the testimony of any witness who has compared the copy to the original. TRCE 1005.

**B. The "Government Record" Exception to the Hearsay Rule.** Government records, if offered for the truth of the matter stated, are hearsay, and would not be admissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule is met. See *Wright v. Lewis*, 777 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) ("Even though official public records or certified copies thereof may be admissible in evidence, that does not mean that ex parte statements, hearsay, conclusions and opinions contained therein are admissible"). There is an exception to the hearsay rule which applies to government records. TRCE 803(8) provides:

**Public Records and Reports.** Records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, of (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, or (C) factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law; unless

the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

See *Cowan v. State*, 840 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (the requirements for admissibility under "public records and reports" exception to the hearsay rule may be met by circumstantial evidence from the face of the offered document); *Wright v. Lewis*, 777 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (letter from assistant U.S. attorney to Podiatry Board was not government record of U.S. Attorney's office, because it was not generated as a document pursuant to the attorney's duties as an assistant U.S. attorney; it was not a record of the State Podiatry Board because it was a third party communication that happened to appear in the records of the Podiatry Board). *Texas v. Williams*, 932 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1995), writ denied, 940 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1996) (disapproving lower court opinion on other grounds), held that a certified copy of a DPS trooper's accident report was properly admitted under the TRCE 803(8) exception to the hearsay rule.

**C. The "Absence of Public Record or Entry" Exception to the Hearsay Rule.** TRCE 803(10) provides:

To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.

See *Harris County v. Allwaste Tank Cleaning, Inc.*, 808 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ dismissed w.o.j.) (affidavit of executive director of Air Control Board stating absence of any permit to operate a facility could not be used as vehicle to introduce the director's interpretation of records that were on file, since that use of the affidavit made it hearsay).

**X. BUSINESS RECORDS (HEARSAY EXCEPTION).** Business records are not excluded by the hearsay rule if they meet the criteria of TRCE 803(6). Rule 803(6) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for records of a regularly conducted activity. The exception applies to:

- a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form
- of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses
- made at or near the time

- by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge
- if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
- all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by affidavit that complies with Rule 902(10).

However, the exception does not apply when the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. TRCE 803(6). For purposes of this exception to the hearsay rule, a business includes any and every kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not.

**Proof by Witness.** Proof that the records meet the Rule 803(6) exception can be made by "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness." TRCE 803(6). *E.P. Operating Co. v. Sonora Exploration Corp.*, 862 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (authenticity established by cross-examination of corporate employee who confirmed that the record was "one of you-all's internal documents at one of these various companies"). See *Sholdra v. Bluebonnet Savings Bank*, 858 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (records not admissible where sponsoring witness failed to testify that records were made by persons with personal knowledge); *Texmarc Conveyor Co. v. Arts*, 857 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (record admissible even though sponsoring witness admitted that he was not familiar with every detail of the record).

**Proof by Affidavit.** Proof that the records meet the Rule 803(6) exception can also be made by affidavit of the custodian or other qualified witness, where the terms of TRCE 902(10) are met. TRCE 902(10)(a) provides:

**(10) Business Records Accompanied by Affidavit.**

(a) *Records or Photocopies; Admissibility; Affidavit; Filing.* Any records or set of records or photographically reproduced copies of such records, which would be admissible under Rule 803(6) or (7) shall be admissible in evidence in any court in this state upon the affidavit of the person who would otherwise provide the prerequisites of Rule 803(6) or (7), provided further, that such record or records along with such affidavit are filed with the clerk of the court for inclusion with the papers in the cause in which the record or records are sought to be used as evidence at least fourteen (14) days prior to the day upon which trial of said cause commences, and provided the

other parties to said cause are given prompt notice by the party filing same of the filing of such record or records and affidavit, which notice shall identify the name and employer, if any, of the person making the affidavit and such records shall be made available to the counsel for other parties to the action or litigation for inspection and copying.

(b) *Form of Affidavit.* A form for the affidavit of such person as shall make such affidavit as it permitted in paragraph (a) above shall be sufficient if it follows this form, though this form shall not be exclusive, and an affidavit which substantially complies with the provisions of this rule shall suffice . . . . [form affidavit omitted]

Business records which are to be offered under a self-authenticating affidavit must be filed with the clerk of the court at least 14 days prior to the date trial begins, and prompt notice of filing given to other litigants. The notice must identify the name and employer, if any, of the person making the affidavit. The records must be made available to other counsel for inspection and copying. TRCE 902(10)(a).

When business records are admitted under this exception to the hearsay rule, they are admitted for the truth of the matter stated in the records. *Overall v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages*, 869 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

**XI. PROOF OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.** As a general rule, a litigant in Texas courts cannot recover attorney's fees for the lawsuit. However, numerous statutes permit the recovery of attorney's fees. The issue arises as to how to prove up the fees in the lawsuit.

TCP&RC § 38.001 permits the recovery of attorney's fees in suits for services rendered, labor performed, material furnished, freight or express overcharges, lost or damaged freight or express, killed or injured stock, a sworn account, or an oral or written contract. When attorney's fees are sought under this provision, the litigant must be represented by an attorney, must present the claim to the opposing party, and payment must have not been tendered within 30 days after the claim is presented. TCP&RC § 38.002. There is a rebuttable presumption that the usual and customary attorney's fees are reasonable. TCP&RC § 38.003. Where the issue of attorney's fees is tried to the court and not a jury, the court may take judicial notice of the usual and customary fees and the contents of the case file without further evidence. TCP&RC § 38.004. This presumption, and power of judicial notice, are available only when attorney's fees are sought under TCP&RC § 38.001. See *Hasty, Inc. v. Inwood Buckhorn Joint Venture*, 908 S.W.2d 494, 503 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1995, writ denied). Fees sought under other provisions of law must be proved by independent evidence. *Sheldon Pollack Corp.*

*v. Pioneer Concrete*, 765 S.W.2d 843, 847-48 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied). In *Geochem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes*, 929 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1996, writ requested), appellees sought to recover attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act (TCP&RC § 37.009). Appellees were represented by several lawfirms, including Bickel & Brewer. One of the appellees testified that he had received and paid Bickel & Brewer's bill, and was familiar with some of the work done. One of Appellees' other attorneys testified that the hourly rates were reasonable and customary. Appellant objected that the Bickel & Brewer bills were hearsay, and could not be authenticated by the testifying lawyer who was not a member of the firm and had no personal knowledge of the work done by Bickel & Brewer. The appellate court sustained the complaint, noting that the Bickel & Brewer bills were not offered as business records.

**XII. HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR PARENTAGE TESTING REPORT** TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.109(b) (West Handbook 1998 ed.) provides that, in a paternity case, a "verified written report of a parentage testing expert is admissible at the trial as evidence of the truth of the matters it contains." See *State v. Owens*, 893 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1995) (error for to exclude paternity testing results based on hearsay objection), *rev'd and dism'd*, 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995).

**XIII. RECORDS OF ONE BUSINESS CONTAINED IN RECORDS OF SECOND BUSINESS.** There are circumstances in which the records of one business have been held to be business records of another business. For example, in *Cockrell v. Republic Mtg. Ins. Co.*, 817 S.W.2d 106, 112-13 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, no writ), the appellate court said that a document from one business can become a record of another business if the second business determines the accuracy of the information generated by the first business. And in *GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc.*, the appellate court found invoices from outside vendors to have become business records of the receiving company, where they became assimilated into company's record-keeping system. See *Duncan Dev., Inc. v. Haney*, 634 S.W.2d 811, 812-13 (Tex. 1982) (subcontractor's invoices became integral part of builder's records where builder's employees' regular responsibilities required them to verify subcontractors' performance and accuracy of the invoices). In *Harris v. State*, 846 S.W.2d 960, 963 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd), the manufacturer's certificate of origin from General Motors Corporation, relating to an automobile, was held to be admissible as a business record of the local automobile dealer. However, the principle was not applied in *Ambassador Dev. Corp. v. Valdez*, 791 S.W.2d 612, 626 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990, no writ), where the court held that repair bills received by a business for repairs to its equipment were

not business records of the business obtaining the repairs.

#### XIV. COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION: AUTHENTICATION & HEARSAY.

**Authentication.** While at one time one appellate court expressed the view that proof regarding the reliability of the computer equipment in question was a necessary prerequisite to the admission of business records generated by that computer, see *Railroad Comm'n v. So. Pacific Co.*, 468 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), any special requirement for proving up the validity of the computer process has been abandoned. Courts now agree that computerized business records can be proved up in the same manner as hand-written business records. See *Voss v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.*, 610 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (computer records admissible if requirements for business records are met). *Accord*, *Longoria v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc.*, 699 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1985, no writ), (computerized business records may be authenticated in the same manner as other business records, and it is not necessary to show that the machine operated properly or that the operator knew what he was doing; at its inception, however, the data itself must be based upon personal knowledge); *Hutchinson v. State*, 642 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. App.--Waco 1982, no writ) (criminal case) (adopting same rule established in civil cases regarding admissibility of computer-generated records). See *Hill v. State*, 644 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1982, no writ) (telephone company records admissible as business records, even though the information was initially recorded automatically on magnetic tape, rather than by human being).

**Best Evidence Rule.** TRCE 1001(3) provides that "[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar device, any print-out or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an 'original'."

**Hearsay.** Hearsay is defined as a statement of a *person*. TRCE 801(a). A machine is not a person, and therefore cannot "make" statements that are hearsay. However, a computer may issue information that *contains* hearsay. In dealing with computerized records, it is important to distinguish human communications stored on a computer, or human communications processed by a computer, from computer-generated information that reflects the internal operation of the computer. For example, in *Burleson v. State*, 802 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref'd), a prosecution for harmful access to computer, the court held that information displayed by computer, as to how many payroll records were missing, was not hearsay, because it was not an out-of-court statement made by a *person*. Even if it were, said the court, the computer operator, who testified based on what he saw on the computer display,

qualified as expert who could rely on the computer's display, even if the display's results were not admissible. The court observed, however, that the information reflected on the computer display was "generated by the computer itself as part of the computer's internal system designed to monitor and describe the status of the system." *Id.* at 439. The court cited two out-of-state cases. In *People v. Holowko*, 109 Ill.2d 187, 93 Ill.Dec. 344, 486 N.E.2d 877, 878-79 (1985), the Illinois Supreme Court held that computerized printouts of phone traces were not hearsay because such printouts did not rely on the assistance, observations, or reports of a human declarant. The print-out was "merely the tangible result of the computer's internal operations." In *State v. Armstead*, 432 So.2d 837, 839-41 (La. 1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that computerized records of phone traces were not hearsay, in that they were computer-generated rather than computer-stored declarations. *Burleson v. State*, 802 S.W.2d at 439 n. 2.

However, in *May v. State*, 784 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd), the appellate court held that numbers viewed on an intoxilyzer's computer screen were hearsay. *May* in turn relied upon *Vanderbilt v. State*, 629 S.W.2d 709, 723-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), which held that it was improper for the state's firearm witness, not testifying as an expert, to relate that a computer search of an FBI database rendered a print-out of a list of weapons that could generate the ballistic markings on the bullet in question, and that the gun in question was on that list. The Court of Criminal Appeals cited to an earlier case where it had held it to be error for a witness to repeat in front of the jury information obtained from a computer database. See *Vanderbilt*, 629 S.W.2d at 723. The conclusion reached in *May* was criticized in Schlueter, *Hearsay--When Machines Talk*, 54 TEX. B.J. 1135 (Oct. 1990). It is apparent that in *May* the Dallas Court of Appeals did not distinguish testimonial information contained in a computer information file from computer-generated calculations based on a scientific algorithm, with no component of human communication.

**Process or System.** If an attack is to be levied on computer-generated information, as opposed to computer-stored human communications, the attack would be under TRCE 901(b)(9), relating to a process or system, for failure to show that a process or system that was used to produce the result produces an accurate result. In the *Holowko* case referred to above, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that judicial notice of the reliability of computer science might be appropriate in certain situations. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in *Armstead*, also referred to above, likened the computer-generated information to demonstrative evidence of a scientific test or experiment.

**E-Mail.** Special problems are presented by electronic mail (E-mail). While a print-out of E-mail is considered to be an original for purposes of the best evidence

rule, TRCE 1101(3), there can still be severe complications surrounding proof of the authorship of an E-mail message, and the accuracy of the permanent record of the E-mail transmission. On some systems it is possible to falsely attribute E-mail to another sender. See Thomas, *Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing Novel Communications Media*, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1992); Peritz, *Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence*, 80 NW. U.L. R. EV. 956 (1986). Verifying E-Mail which passed through the Internet is even more problematic, since Internet E-Mail message is essentially a public communication that is subject to interception and manipulation at many points in its journey.

**XV. SOCIAL STUDIES.** Social studies prepared under the Texas Family Code present interesting questions regarding admissibility. The following may be helpful in evaluating the question.

**A. Controlling Family Code Provisions.** Section 107.051(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that, in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may order the preparation of a social study. The social study may be made by any person appointed by the court. The study must comply with the rules of the Texas Department of Human Services which relate to minimum standards, guidelines and procedures for social studies, or according to criteria established by the court. The person making the social study must file his or her findings and conclusions with the court. Section 107.054 further provides that, "[t]he report shall be made a part of the record of the suit." Section 107.055(a) provides that "[d]isclosure to the jury of the contents of a report to the court of a social study is subject to the rules of evidence." The Family Code thus expressly authorizes the admission of the social study into evidence before a jury, "subject to the rules of evidence."

**B. Supreme Court Authority.** In the case of *Green v. Remling*, 608 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1980), the Supreme Court analyzed in detail the legal basis for the admission of a social study into evidence. In *Green v. Remling*, the Supreme Court made it clear that a trial judge may read and consider the entire contents of a social study without the necessity of marking it as an exhibit and admitting it into evidence. When the disclosure of the social study to the jury is involved, normal rules of evidence apply. The Court said:

The inclusion of the social study in the "record" makes it unnecessary to formally introduce it in evidence. It is before the court for all purposes, but only those portions of the study which are admissible under the rules of evidence may be disclosed to the jury.

**C. The Rules of Evidence.** Section 104.001 of the Texas Family Code provides that "[t]he Texas Rules of Civil Evidence apply as in other civil cases." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 104.001 (West Handbook 1998 ed.). A court-ordered social study filed with the clerk of the court may fit the definition of "public records and reports," which are an exception to the hearsay rule. Social studies almost invariably are filed with the Clerk of the Court. They may constitute records, reports, statements, or data compilations of the Court, and of the Clerk of the Court. The reports set forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report." The reports also consist of "factual findings resulting from an investigation made to the authority granted by law." Thus, the social studies may fall within the exception to the hearsay rule set out in TRCE 803(8). This was the holding of *Bingham v. Bingham*, 811 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ). Additionally, Section 107.055(a) of the Texas Family Code makes it clear that the social study may be disclosed to the jury, subject to the rules of evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.055(a) (West Handbook 1998 ed.).

Additional problems arise with regard to hearsay contained within the social study. Social studies are typically laced with statements made by third parties to the social worker.

Many social study consist of three parts: (i) the general description of the parties and the situation; (ii) specific findings and recommendations of the social worker; (iii) witness-by-witness recitations of what various collateral contacts said to the social worker. A trial court could logically justify letting in category (ii), but not (i) or (iii). A trial court could logically justify letting in category (i) and (ii), but not category (iii). A trial court could logically justify letting in all three categories. In the Author's experience, one trial judge let in all three categories of information on the ground that the expert was disclosing on direct examination the underlying facts or data, as permitted by TRCE 705. The court further reasoned that all parties had had the social study for some time, and that if the recitals in the social study were wrong, the other party could have raised a complaint as to inaccuracy, called the person in question to testify to the contrary of what was in the social study, or taken that person's deposition. See *All Saints Episcopal Hosp. v. M.S.*, 791 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990) (although report by DHS social worker met hearsay exception of TRCE 803(8), parts of report containing third party hearsay was not admissible), *vacated pursuant to settlement*, 801 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1991); *Bounds v. Scurlock Oil Co.*, 730 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (portions of officer's accident report not admissible since they were hearsay descriptions of the accident by occupants of two vehicles involved in the accident).

**D. Other Authorities.** There are other evidentiary rules which could make the contents of a social study admissible into evidence. Under TRCE 801(e)(2), an admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay. To constitute an admission by a party-opponent, the statement need only be offered against a party where the statement is (A) his own statement in either his individual or representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Typically, a social study might contain a number of admissions by parties are contained in a social study. These comments are therefore not hearsay. Various statements could also fit hearsay exceptions defined in Rule 803 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. For example, various statements in a social study could reflect a then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, which is an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(3). If the disclosures constitute reputation concerning personal or family history, they are an exception to the hearsay Rule 803(19). Certain statements could constitute reputation as to character, fitting the exception contained in Rule 803(21). Other comments could constitute statements against interest, an exception under Rule 803(24).

**XVI. AUTHENTICATION OF AUDIOTAPES.** The general rule regarding the admissibility of tape recordings of conversations is stated in *Boarder to Boarder Trucking, Inc. v. Mondt, Inc.*, 831 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no writ):

Tape recordings are a fair representation of a transaction, conversation, or occurrence. *Seymour v. Gillespie*, 608 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Tex. 1980). A fair representation may be shown by these seven elements: 1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony, 2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent, 3) establishment of the authenticity of the correctness of the recording, 4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made, 5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording, 6) identification of the speakers, and 7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. *Id.* Some of these elements may be inferred and need not be shown in detail. *Id.*

*Seymour v. Gillespie*, 608 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Tex. 1980); *In re TLH*, 630 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, writ dismissed). "Some of these elements may be inferred and need not be shown in detail. For example, if a person hears and records a conversation or hears a conversation and a recording of the conversa-

tion, testified the recording is a fair representation, it can be inferred the recording device was capable of taking testimony and the operator was competent. The voluntary nature of the conversation may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case." *Seymour*, at 898. See *Hinote v. Local 4-23*, 777 S.W.2d 134, 146-47 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (tape recording admitted).

The same rule was previously applied in criminal cases. See *Edwards v. State*, 551 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (applying 7-step test to tape recordings). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has abandoned the *Edwards* approach, in favor of the general methods of authentication set out in the Rules of Evidence, such as distinctive characteristics, voice identification, call to phone number assigned to a particular person or business, corroborated by surrounding circumstances; process or system; etc. *Stapleton v. State*, 868 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (although police department tape recording was properly authenticated by TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(a), the tape recording did not meet the business record exception to the hearsay rule because no one associated with police department had personal knowledge about things said on the tape). See *Narvaiz v. State*, 840 S.W.2d 415, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (police department tape of 911 call admitted based on testimony police dispatcher who took the call); *Allen v. State*, 849 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. refused) (unnecessary to identify background voices as condition to admitting tape); *Leos v. State*, 847 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, pet. granted) (error to admit tape recording where some of the voices on the tape were not identified); *Brooks v. State*, 833 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, no pet.) (duplicate copy of tape recording of 911 call was properly authenticated, even though it was electronically enhanced to remove tape hiss). Using the new approach to authentication, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled a videotape inadmissible in *Kephart v. State*, 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

Under the new rule of the *Stapleton* case, the ordinary methods of authentication apply. See Schlueter, *Authentication: Audio- and Videotapes Revisited*, 57 TEX. B.J. 981 (1994).

One case has held that, when the tapes are admitted, it is error to admit written transcripts of the tapes. However, the error was found harmless because the information was cumulative. *In re Thoma*, 873 S.W.2d 477, 487-88 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (judicial disciplinary proceeding).

Note that there can still be a hearsay problem, even when audiotapes have been authenticated.

**XVII. ILLEGAL TAPE RECORDINGS.** Both federal and Texas statutes prohibit the tape recording of a conversation unless at least one party to the conversation knows of and consents to the taping at the time of taping. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 et seq. (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon 1994). Both the federal statute and the TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 123.001 (Vernon 1997) ("Interception of Communication") recognizes a cause of action for such illegal behavior. An issue arises as to whether an illegally-acquired tape recording can be used in a civil court proceeding.

**Exclusionary Rule.** Criminal law provides that *unconstitutionally*-acquired evidence cannot be used by the government against a defendant. See *Weeks v. U.S.*, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (under the so-called "exclusionary rule," evidence obtained by the government in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights cannot be used in federal prosecution); *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the *Weeks* rule to state court prosecutions). The U.S. Supreme Court, in determining whether to exclude unconstitutionally-acquired evidence from a civil proceeding involving the U.S. government, balances the likely social benefits of applying the exclusionary rule against the cost of excluding the evidence. *U.S. v. Janis*, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). In *Janis*, the exclusionary rule prevailed in a federal income tax case brought against a "bookie." The exclusionary rule lost out in *Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); a civil deportation proceeding. These matters are explored in detail in *Vara v. Sharp*, 880 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ), where evidence seized in derogation of constitutional privacy rights was excluded from a state tax proceeding.

**Is There an Exclusionary Rule in Private Civil Litigation?** The public policies announced in connection with the criminal exclusionary rule involve deterrence against the state violating the constitutional rights of persons. The policies do not necessarily apply civil litigation between private persons. One case has held that in civil suits evidence otherwise admissible may not be excluded because it has been wrongfully obtained. *Sims v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co.*, 663 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Testimony of a real estate appraiser was suppressed in *Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate*, 803 S.W.2d 361, 372-73 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990, no writ), where the appraiser trespassed on the opposing party's real estate to make his appraisal. However, this was done as a discovery sanction and not pursuant to a civil "exclusionary rule."

**Evidence Obtained by Wiretapping.** In *Turner v. P.V. Int'l. Corp.*, 765 S.W.2d 455, 469-70 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988), writ denied, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam), the court of appeals held that the Federal anti-wiretapping statute precludes admission of tapes of tele-

phone conversations that were recorded in violation of the statute. In that case the Supreme Court, by per curiam opinion, stated that it was reserving its judgment regarding the illegality and admissibility of wiretap tapes. See *Fabian v. Fabian*, 765 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.--Austin 1989, no writ) ("fruit of the poisonous tree" argument rejected because information came from sources other than wiretap); *Kortla v. Kortla*, 718 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("tape recordings, even if obtained without the consent of a party to it, are admissible if the proper predicate is laid"). In *Collins v. Collins*, 904 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), writ denied, 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam), the First Court of Appeals sitting en banc reversed a divorce and custody case in which the court-appointed mental health expert had listened to tape-recordings of conversations that the court of appeals believed had been illegally recorded. The Court held that illegally taped recordings cannot be used in a civil proceeding.

There is disagreement among the courts as to whether the federal statute prohibits one spouse from surreptitiously tape-recording the other spouse in the family home. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals says no, in *Simpson v. Simpson*, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), and several other courts agree. See *Anonymous v. Anonymous*, 558 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1977). Other courts disagree, and say that the behavior is illegal as between spouses in the family home. See *Pritchard v. Pritchard*, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); *U.S. v. Jones*, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).

#### **XVIII. INVOKING FIFTH AMENDMENT; STRIKING OF PLAINTIFF'S PLEADINGS.**

**Invoking the Privilege.** A witness in a civil proceeding can invoke the self-incrimination privilege. *Kastigar v. U.S.*, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). For non-parties, it must be done outside the presence of the jury, "to the extent practicable." TRCE 513. See *In re L.S.*, 748 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1988, no writ) (where witness testified fully on some questions and only selectively invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, impracticable to isolate invocation of privilege outside presence of jury). A party can be required to invoke the privilege *in the presence of the jury*, and opposing counsel *can comment* to the jury and the jury may draw an inference therefrom. TRCE 513(c).

The witness must show that the answer is likely to be hazardous, but need not disclose the very information the privilege protects. The witness is not, however, the exclusive judge of his right, and the trial court can determine good faith and justifiability. Court can compel only if it is "perfectly clear" that the witness is mistaken and the testimony cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate. *Ex parte Butler*, 522 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1975).

In a criminal proceeding, the accused cannot be called to testify by the prosecution. In a civil proceeding, a party or witness cannot refuse to take the stand. In a civil proceeding, a litigant may propound questions to the witness, and it is up to the witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination as to particular questions. R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 473 (3d ed. 1980), *McInnis v. State*, 618 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1981), *cert. den.*, 456 U.S. 976 (1982). In a *criminal* contempt proceeding, however, the contemnor cannot be forced to take the witness stand. *Ex parte Werblud*, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976). *But see Ex parte Burroughs*, 687 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985) (not error to call accused to witness stand in child support contempt proceeding); *c.f. Ex parte Burroughs*, 687 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985) (not error to force contemnor in contempt proceeding to give his name, his employment and his office location); *Ex parte Snow*, 677 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (where prima facie showing of contempt is made independently, error in compelling relator to testify is harmless). The contemnor in a *civil* contempt proceeding is not the focus of a prosecution, and therefore can be called to the witness stand, but he can nevertheless refuse to incriminate himself through his own testimony, under the authority of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. *Ex parte Butler*, 522 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1975).

**Striking pleadings.** In the case of *Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals*, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985), the Supreme Court of Texas held that a party seeking affirmative relief cannot invoke a privilege to preclude the defendant from obtaining information necessary to defend against the claim. That is "using the privilege as a sword, not a shield," and in that situation the trial court can force the party invoking the privilege to either waive the privilege or suffer dismissal of his affirmative claims. In *Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis*, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993), the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged test to apply in such situations:

First, before a waiver may be found the party asserting the privilege must seek affirmative relief. [FN9] Second, the privileged information sought must be such that, if believed by the fact finder, in all probability it would be outcome determinative of the cause of action asserted. Mere relevance is insufficient. A contradiction in position without more is insufficient. The confidential communication must go to the very heart of the affirmative relief sought. Third, disclosure of the confidential communication must be the only means by which the aggrieved party may obtain the evidence. [FN10] If any one of these requirements is lacking, the trial court

must uphold the privilege. [FN11] [Content of footnotes omitted]

In *Tex. Dept. of Public Safety Officers Ass'n v. Denton*, 897 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1995), the Supreme Court said that "[g]enerally, the exercise of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege should not be penalized." *Id.* at 502. The Court said that in imposing a sanction for refusing to testify based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court must consider whether sanctions less severe than dismissal of the claim for affirmative relief would be effective to redress the problem. *Id.* at 504-05. Such alternatives would be, for example, to restrict questions to avoid self-incrimination while still permitting discovery. Or to prohibit the plaintiff from introducing evidence on matters where the privilege was invoked. Or to delay the civil proceeding until the outcome of the criminal prosecution.

**XIX. WITNESS REFRESHING MEMORY.** A witness is permitted to refresh his or her memory by looking at notes or prior writings. However, under TRCE 612, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for purposes of testifying, the opposing party may be able to see that writing. If the witness uses the writing to refresh memory while testifying, the opposing party's right to see the writing is absolute. If the witness uses the writing to refresh memory before testifying, the other party can see the writing if the trial court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interest of justice. *See City of Dennison v. Grisham*, 716 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, no writ).

**XX. TELEPHONE DEPOSITIONS.** A party may take the deposition on oral questions of a witness over the telephone. TRCP 202.2. However, the use of the telephone must be authorized by written stipulation of the parties, or by order of the court, upon motion and notice to the parties. *Id.* It is permissible for the court reporter to administer the oath to the unseen deponent over the telephone, *provided the witness ultimately swears to the deposition under oath in the presence of a notary public.* *Clone Component Distributors of America, Inc. v. State*, 819 S.W.2d 593, 597-98 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, no writ); *see Green v. Reyes*, 836 S.W.2d 203, 213 n. 10 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (agreeing that court reporter need not be in room with deponent).

In the *Clone Component* case, the Dallas court of appeals considered the propriety of having the court reporter in the room with the lawyers while the witness was on the other end of the telephone line. Citing a 1904 case holding that an oath taken over the telephone is not valid because the officer administering the oath could not identify the affiant, the Dallas court of appeals suggested that the old case's concern is still valid, but that the problem could be surmounted by having the deponent swear to the contents of the deposition, in the presence of a notary public, after the deposition is

transcribed. *Id.* at 599. The complaining party also argued that there is no way to confirm that the person giving the answers is the same one who took the oath. The court of appeals said that the post-transcription swearing corrected that problem, as well. The Dallas court said that if the witness refused to swear to the truth of the deposition after transcription, that the trial court could suppress the deposition. *Id.* at 599.

Under the *Clone Component* case, the court reporter who administers the oath could be either in the room with the witness or in the room with the lawyers. Perhaps the problem of an oath given over the telephone could also be alleviated by having a notary public appear with the deponent and swear the witness in on the other end of the phone line, in addition to the court reporter at the office of the lawyer swearing the witness over the telephone. And the witness can again swear to his/her testimony by appearing before a notary public and signing an affidavit attached to the written deposition, stating that the testimony is true and correct.

The *Clone Component* case also considered the use of exhibits in a telephone deposition. The appellate court suggested that the exhibits could be mailed to the witness in advance, pre-marked with exhibit numbers. The exhibits could then be attached to the deposition and the deponent could check the legitimacy of the exhibits before swearing to the written transcription of the deposition. Another alternative suggested by the court is to telefax the exhibits to the witness during the deposition.

If there is a possibility that someone might coach the witness on the unseen other end of the telephone line, arrange to videotape the deponent while he is testifying. See Branton, *Deposition Problems: The Obstructive Lawyer; Objections, Payment, Duty to Supplement, Etc.*, STATE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY COURSE P-5 (1991).

**XXI. USING DEPOSITION FROM ANOTHER CASE.** TRCE 804(b)(1) ("Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable") creates an exception to the hearsay rule for the testimony of a witness given at a prior hearing in the same or another case, or testimony given in a deposition taken in another case, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or a person with similar interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. In *Keene Corp. v. Rogers*, 863 S.W.2d 168, 176-77 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, bankruptcy filed), a party offered a deposition of an expert witness taken in 1983, in a case against the same corporate defendant, regarding when the witness informed the corporation about the dangers to workers of products containing asbestos. The tender was rejected, because there was no showing that the witness was "unavailable." The Court remarked that "[I]n Texas, unavailability of a witness means that the witness is dead, has

become insane, is physically unable to testify, is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or that the whereabouts of the witness is unknown and that a diligent search has been made to find the witness, or that the witness has been kept away from the trial by the adverse party." *Id.* at 177. See *Hall v. White*, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1975). In the present case, counsel only made the unsworn assertion that the witness was aged and no longer appearing live in court cases.

**XXII. EDITING AND MIXING VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITIONS.** In editing a videotaped deposition for playing at trial, what is the propriety of switching around questions and answers so that they flow in a different sequence from the original sequence?

There has been some disagreement over that point. In *Jones v. Colley*, 820 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992, no writ), an issue arose as to whether a party could rearrange a videotaped deposition, and play it in its new sequence to the jury. Chief Justice Cornelius authored an opinion saying that "[a] party, as a matter of trial strategy, is entitled to present his evidence in the order he believes constitutes the most effective presentation of his case, provided that it does not convey a *distinctly false* impression." *Id.* at 866. [Emphasis added.] The Chief Justice wrote, however, that it would not be proper to introduce a partial answer to a single question, or to mismatch questions and answers. *Id.* at 866, n. 1. However, the trial court had the power to order the entire deposition into evidence, under the rule of optional completeness, TRCE 106. *Id.* Justice Bleil concurred in the holding, while nonetheless saying that the Chief Justice's opinion was "ill advised and overly broad." *Id.* at 868 (Bleil, J., concurring). He contested the view that a party has an absolute right to present evidence in any order he wanted, so long as a false impression was not created. Justice Bleil believed that the trial court has great leeway in directing the order of trial proceedings and that refusal to permit a party to play to the jury a rearranged video deposition should not be reversible error. Justice Grant concurred separately, agreeing with the trial court's stated concern that the opposing party's right for the jury to hear the cross-examination and re-cross relating to the direct examination and re-direct would be difficult to sort out if the order of the direct and re-direct were altered. *Id.* at 868.

**XXIII. ADMISSION OF A PARTY OPPONENT.** An admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay, even if it is an out-of-court statement. TRCE 801(e)(2). To be an admission of a party-opponent, the statement must be offered against a party, and it must be (i) the party's own statement, or (ii) a statement made by an agent authorized to speak for the party, or (iii) a statement which the party has ratified, or (iv) a statement by an agent made during the existence of the relationship and relating to matters within the scope and course of the agency. Statements made by co-conspirators are also

included. *Id.* The failure of a party to disclose a fact on a prior occasion can also be an admission that the fact did not exist. See *Waldon v. City of Longview*, 855 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1993, no writ) ("If an event is of such salient importance that the declarant would ordinarily have been expected to relate it, the failure of a party to mention the event in a prior statement may constitute an admission that the event did not occur").

**XXIV. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT.** The rule for impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement is TRCE 613:

- before further cross-examination regarding the prior inconsistent statement, and before any proof is made regarding the content of the statement, the examiner must: tell the witness (i) the contents of the statement and (ii) the time, place and person to whom it was made and must (iii) give the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement.
- It is not necessary to show the prior inconsistent statement to the witness, but upon request the examiner must show the statement to opposing counsel.
- if witness unequivocally admits having made the statement, extrinsic evidence of the statement cannot be admitted.

Thus, under TRCE 613(a), prior to examining a witness about a prior inconsistent statement, counsel must tell the witness the contents of the statement, and the time and place and to whom the statement was made, and must afford the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. Extrinsic evidence of the prior statement is admissible only if the witness does not unequivocally admit making the statement. The questioner need not show the statement, if in writing, to the witness. However, the other attorney is entitled to see it in writing.

If the prior inconsistent statement is that of the opposing party, then TRCE 613 does not apply. TRCE 613 expressly states that it does not apply to admissions of a party opponent. So you don't have to follow this procedure with an admission of a party opponent.

See *U.S. v. Valdez-Soto*, No. 91-10622 (9th Cir. 8-10-94) (2-1 decision) (where witness testified differently from a prior statement, the prior inconsistent statement was admissible as *substantive evidence*, despite the fact that it is hearsay). See *Chance v. Chance*, 911 S.W.2d 40, 54 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (where witness made 16 denials of prior statements, it was proper to play a tape of the conversation for rebuttal and impeachment purposes).

**XXV. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.** A question arises as to whether or not the rule regarding impeachment by prior inconsistent statement applies to prior contradictory deposition testimony.

It appears that a conflict exists between TRCE 613 (impeaching witness) and TRCP 207(1), which says that in a trial or hearing, "any part or all of a deposition . . . may be used by any person for any purpose against any party . . ." The case of *Pope v. Stephenson*, 774 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989), writ denied *per curiam*, 787 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1990), says that a prior inconsistent statement in a deposition can be considered only for the purpose of impeachment, and not as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted.

**XXVI. CALLING A WITNESS SOLELY TO LATER IMPEACH THAT WITNESS.** Any witness can be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement. TRCE 607 & 613. A party can impeach his own witness. TRCE 607. However, a party cannot call a witness solely for the purpose of later impeachment using otherwise inadmissible hearsay. *Qualicare of East Texas, Inc. v. Runnels*, 863 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1993, no writ); *Truco Properties, Inc. v. Charlton*, 749 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1988, writ den'd).

**XXVII. THE RULE OF OPTIONAL COMPLETENESS.** The Rule of Optional Completeness, TRCE 106, says that when one party introduces part of a writing or recorded statement the adverse party may then or later introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously. *Azar Nut Co. v. Caille*, 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1986), *aff'd*, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987), extends the application of the doctrine to a letter written in response to another letter which was admitted into evidence. Justice Nathan Hecht, in Hecht, *Common Evidence Problems*, STATE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY COURSE pp. DD 4-6 (1990), suggested that the rule applies to reading from depositions, but not to ordinary oral testimony.

**XXVIII. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION IS ADMISSIBLE.** Ordinarily, documents are hearsay and are inadmissible unless they meet an exception to the hearsay rule. TRCE 801. One case held that a party's written response to a request for production "should be treated in the same manner as documents produced in response to the request." *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cordo*, 856 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, writ denied). In that case, the defendant's response that "the store did not have a safety manual at the time of the incident in question" was properly read to the jury.

**XXIX. "IN THE PRESENCE OF A PARTY" HEARSAY EXCEPTION.** There is a de facto exception to the hearsay rule, sometimes called the "in the presence of the party" rule, that is honored by trial courts although it is without legal support.

Your opponent is eliciting testimony from a witness, and is about to elicit hearsay. You object. Your opponent rises and says: "Your Honor, this conversation occurred in the presence of counsel's client." The judge overrules your hearsay objection. The ruling is wrong, because there is no such exception to the hearsay rule. The rule is probably an over-extension of the concept of an admission of a party-opponent. A statement of a party which is offered against him is defined not to be hearsay. TRCE 801(e)(2). Some cases have said that the failure of a party to disagree when a statement is made in his/her presence can operate as an admission by silence if the ordinary person would be expected to disagree with the statement when made. *See Tucker v. State*, 471 S.W.2d 523, 532-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), *cert. denied*, 492 U.S. 912 (1989). This is not, however, a general rule that all statements made by others in the presence of a party are admissible.

**XXX. RELIABILITY OF EXPERT'S METHODOLOGY.** In the case of *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 overturned earlier case law requiring that expert scientific testimony must be based upon principles which have "general acceptance" in the field to which they belong. Under Rule 702, the expert's opinion must be based on "scientific knowledge," which requires that it be derived by the scientific method, meaning the formulation of hypotheses which are verified by experimentation or observation. The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the *Daubert* analysis for TRCE 702, requiring that the expert's underlying scientific technique or principle be reliable. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995). The Texas Supreme Court listed factors for the trial court to consider: (1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique's potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. *Robinson*, 923 S.W.2d at 557. *See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye*, 907 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1995) (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (applying the *Daubert* analysis to an expert's testing of pigs' feet and rejecting the test results as not being sufficiently scientific); *America West Airline Inc. v. Tope*, 935 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1996, no writ) (somewhat unorthodox methods of mental health worker did not meet the admissibility requirements of *Robinson*).

Ordinarily, the burden is on the party offering the evidence, to establish the admissibility of such scientific evidence. *Du Pont*, at 557.

The reliability requirement for expert testimony has become one of the most controversial evidentiary issues, nationwide. Virtually every week some court in the USA makes a ruling on *Daubert* or *Robinson*-like issues. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which established a reliability requirement even before the U.S. Supreme Court decided *Daubert* (see *Kelly v. State*, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), has extended reliability requirements to *all* scientific testimony, not just novel science. *See Hartman v. State*, 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (applying *Kelly*-reliability standards to DWI intoxilyzer). The Waco Court of Appeals has extended the *Kelly* requirements to psychological testimony, in *Fowler v. State*, No. 10-96-190-CR (Tex. App.--Waco, Nov. 26, 1997, n.p.h.). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a lengthy opinion saying that reliability standards applied to a clinical physician, but that the standards differed from those in *Daubert*, which it described as appropriate for "Newtonian science." *See Moore v. Ashland Chemical Co., Inc.*, 95-20492 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 1997) (rehearing en banc granted and argued Jan. 20, 1998). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a defendant in a U.S. military prosecution does not have a constitutional right to offer lie detector evidence, in *U.S. v. Scheffer*, 96-1133 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).

**XXXI. EXPERT AS CONDUIT FOR HEARSAY.** Lay witnesses can express opinions, but they cannot rely upon hearsay in formulating those opinions. TRCE 701. Experts, on the other hand, can rely upon hearsay in formulating opinions, as long as the hearsay is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. TRCE 703.

TRCE 705 provides that an expert "may disclose on direct examination, or be required to disclose on cross-examination, the underlying facts or data" on which his/her opinion is based. A question arises as to what extent an expert can relate to the jury hearsay upon which his opinion is based.

In Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL & CRIMINAL § 705.3 (Texas Practice 1988), the professors state their opinion that "[i]f an expert has relied upon hearsay in forming an opinion, and the hearsay is of a type reasonably relied upon by such experts, the jury should ordinarily be permitted to hear it."

However, in *Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital*, 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987), the Supreme Court said that "ordinarily an expert witness should not be permitted to recount hearsay conversation with a third person, even if that conversation forms part of the basis of his opinion."

In *First Southwest Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell*, 769 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1989, writ denied), the court said that "[A] much better argument can be made against the admission on direct examination of unauthenticated underlying data . . . ." In that case, the trial court permitted a fire marshal to tell the jury that his opinion that arson occurred was based partially upon what an eyewitness to the fire told him. The expert was not, however, permitted to say to the jury that the witness said he had seen someone speeding away from the building just after the fire started. The trial court also excluded the fire marshal's report, on the grounds that although it met the government record exception to the hearsay rule, it contained hearsay, to-wit: a recounting of what the eye witness had told the fire marshal.

In *Kramer v. Lewisville Mem. Hosp.*, 831 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, writ granted), the court said: "While such supporting evidence is not automatically admissible because it is supporting data to an expert's opinion, neither is it automatically excludable simply because it is hearsay. The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is one within the trial court's sound discretion."

In *Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.*, 821 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, writ denied), the court held that permitting an expert to testify that he relied upon a government report did not make the report admissible. Citing *First Southwest Lloyds Ins. v. MacDowell*, the court said that "the better judicial position is not to allow the affirmative admission of otherwise inadmissible matters merely because such matters happen to be underlying data upon which an expert relies."

In *Pyle v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.*, 774 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ dismissed), the appellate court reversed due to the trial court's refusal to permit an expert to relate hearsay regarding prior accidents at a railroad crossing as the basis for his opinion that the crossroad was extra-hazardous.

In *Decker v. Hatfield*, 798 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1990, writ dismissed w.o.j.), it was not error to permit a psychologist to tell the jury that the child said he wanted to live with his mother. The appellate court cited the Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot treatise excerpt saying that the jury ordinarily should be entitled to hear the underlying hearsay, and relied upon TRCE 705 to hold that the evidence was admissible to show the basis for the expert's opinion.

In *New Braunfels Factory Outlet Center v. IHOP Realty Corp.*, 872 S.W.2d 303, 310 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ), the court held that an expert properly testified from a hearsay magazine article, when that was one of the bases of his opinion.

This debate will be greatly impacted by new Rule of Evidence 705. The Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals have brought into civil litigation certain provisions that appeared in the criminal rule but not the civil rule. New Rule 705 reads (the language new to the civil rule is underlined):

**RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION**

- (a) **Disclosure of Facts or Data.** The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the expert's reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event disclose on direct examination, or be required to disclose on cross-examination, the underlying facts or data.
- (b) **Voir dire.** Prior to the expert giving the expert's opinion or disclosing the underlying facts or data, a party against whom the opinion is offered upon request in a criminal case shall, or in a civil case may, be permitted to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. This examination shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury.
- (c) **Admissibility of opinion.** If the court determines that the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis for the expert's opinion under Rule 702 or 703, the opinion is inadmissible.
- (d) **Balancing test; limiting instructions.** When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence, the court shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for a purpose other than as explanation or support for the expert's opinion outweighs their value as explanation or support or are unfairly prejudicial. If otherwise inadmissible facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request.

**Notes and Comments**

Comment to 1998 change: Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are based on the former Criminal Rule and are made applicable to civil cases. This rule does not preclude a party in any case from conducting a *voir dire* examination into the qualifications of an expert.

It can be seen that new Rule 705(b) offers a right to *voir dire* the expert about the underlying facts or data outside the presence of the jury. Rule 705(c) permits

the trial court to reject expert testimony if the court determines that the expert doesn't have a sufficient basis for his opinion. And Rule 705(d) establishes a balancing test for underlying facts or data that are inadmissible except to support the expert's opinion: the court should exclude the inadmissible underlying information if the danger of misuse outweighs the value as explanation or support for the expert opinion.

**XXXII. PROVING UP DAMAGES ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT.** Failure of a defendant to file an answer admits liability. However, it does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden to prove unliquidated damages with competent evidence.

Assume that the lawyer is proving up unliquidated damages in a default judgment proceeding. TRCE 802 provides that hearsay evidence admitted without objection has probative value. And TRCE 103(a)(1) and new TRAP 33.1 provide that to preserve complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely objection and secure a ruling from the trial court or your complaint is waived. Given all that, consider the following three questions:

1. At the default judgment hearing, can the plaintiff testify to hearsay, and the hearsay evidence is competent for purposes of appeal?
2. Can the plaintiff submit affidavits of third parties who do not appear at the hearing, and have the affidavits be given full evidentiary weight?
3. Can the plaintiff submit unsworn written statements of third parties who do not appear at the hearing, and have the affidavits be given full evidentiary weight?

When the issue arises in writ of error appeals from default judgments, the courts of appeals are divided on the question. For example, in *Tankard-Smith, Inc. General Contractors v. Thursby*, 663 S.W.2d 473, 478-79 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, where the appellant in a writ of error appeal raised issues that must be preserved by complaint in the trial court and had not preserved error on those complaints in the trial court, it had waived error on those grounds. A later decision by the Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, at least as to the Rules of Procedure then in effect, saying that old TRCP 373 (carried forward as amended in old TRAP 52 which has been amended and is now new TRAP 33.1) provided that where a party had no opportunity to object to a ruling at the time it was made, the absence of an objection does not waive error on appeal. *First Dallas Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins*, 727 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ). The Dallas Court said that to preclude consideration of any error that was not preserved by objection during the trial from which the appellant was absent would "vitate the

remedy of review by writ of error." *Id.* at 646. The Court noted, however, that the language in TRCP 373 which it was relying on in its holding was not carried forward into old TRAP 52, and said that the applicability of the requirement in old TRAP 52(a) for preservation of error was for later courts to decide. *Id.* at 647.

**XXXIII. OPINIONS ON LEGAL QUESTIONS VS. FACT-LAW QUESTIONS.**

Experts cannot testify what the law of the forum state is. Law of sister states and foreign countries is okay, but not law of Texas. *Cluett v. Medical Protective Co.*, 829 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied), was a contract case, involving scope of coverage under an insurance policy. The court of appeals ruled that an expert could not render an opinion on whether a particular event was or was not within the scope of an insurance policy. The court cited an earlier case which held that the question of "whether or not a legal duty exists under a given set of facts and circumstances is a question of law for the court." *St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rahn*, 641 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). In *Texas Workers' Compensation Com'n v. Garcia*, 862 S.W.2d 61, 105 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1993), *rev'd on other grounds*, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995), the appellate court held that expert testimony of a law professor as to the constitutionality of a statute was not admissible, since it was opinion testimony on a legal issue. However, in *Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth*, 861 S.W.2d 926, 938-39 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993), *rev'd on other grounds*, 898 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1995), the appellate court held that expert testimony of a former Texas Supreme Court justice regarding the proper procedure for settling a personal injury claim of a minor child, and whether it had been followed in this instance, was admissible. And in *Lyondell Petrochemical Co. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.*, 888 S.W.2d 547, 554 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), a former OSHA compliance officer could testify whether a training regimen did or did not comply with OSHA regs, since that was a mixed fact law question involving the application of OSHA regs to the facts of the case.

In *Welder v. Welder*, 794 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ), a divorce case involving tracing of commingled separate and community funds, the appellate court held the trial court properly refused to let Wife's attorney cross-examine Husband's CPA as to the CPA's understanding of the community-money-out-first presumption under the *Sibley* case. However, the court noted a "host of legal problems" raised by the *Birchfield* rule permitting a witness to testify on mixed fact-law questions. Where the "law part" is debatable, one party's right to elicit expert testimony on mixed fact-law questions collides with the opponent's right to cross-examine, all in the context of the trial court's power to restrict cross-examination to avoid jury confusion.

The court, in *Crum & Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.*, 887 S.W.2d 103, 134 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1994, writ dismissed by agr.), explores the distinction between an expert testifying on mixed fact-law questions and pure law questions. The court posited the following definition of a mixed fact-law question:

[A]n opinion or issue involves a mixed question of law and fact when a standard or measure has been fixed by law and the question is whether the person or conduct measures up to that standard.

*Id.* at p. 134. Using this standard, it was not error to permit the expert to testify that Mary Carter agreements at issue in the case were against public policy.

In *Holden v. Weidenfeller*, 929 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied), the trial judge excluded expert testimony from a law school professor, who was Board Certified in Real Estate Law, based upon the pleadings, depositions, and documents on file in the case, as to whether an easement appurtenant, an easement by estoppel or a public dedication existed in the case. The appellate court held that the opinion offered was not one of pure law, but rather of mixed fact-law. However, since the trial was to the court without a jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony since it was not "helpful to the trier of fact," as required by TRCE 702. This is because the trial court, being a legal expert himself, was "perfectly capable of applying the law to the facts and reaching a conclusion without benefit of expert testimony from another attorney." *Id.* at 134.

See *Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Sharp*, 951 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, writ denied) (former Attorney General Waggoner Carr not permitted to testify that changes to the Texas Tax Code were substantive, since statutory construction is a pure question of law).

**XXXIV. DEMONSTRATIVE AIDS.** Demonstrative aids are charts, and diagrams, and slides, and transparencies used by lawyers and witnesses in the courtroom to explain testimony to the judge or jury.

Duty to Produce in Advance of Trial. When a party has requested the production of all documents relating to the case, a question arises as to whether the opposing party is required to produce charts and diagrams 30 days in advance of trial. The Author could find no published cases addressing the question.

Admissibility of Demonstrative Aids. "The admission of charts or diagrams which are designed to summarize or emphasize a witness's testimony is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." *Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate*, 803 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990, no writ). "In a complex case, trial courts have the discretion to allow

the use of charts to aid the jury. *Speier v. Webster College*, 616 S.W.2d 617, 618-19 (Tex. 1981). Furthermore, charts merely summarizing previously admitted evidence are rarely, if ever, the source of reversible error." *Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Vollmer*, 805 S.W.2d 825, 832 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). See *Hugh Wood Ford, Inc. v. Galloway*, 830 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (not error to admit list of expenses plaintiffs incurred as a result of defendant's alleged wrongdoing; list was not summary of voluminous writings, and plaintiffs testified to the same information).

Lawyer's Notes on Flip Chart. Can a lawyer stand up in the courtroom and write on a flip chart his/her shorthand summary of what the witness says? For example, a five minute answer is written down as "Lost Profits = \$250,000.00"? Trial courts routinely permit this. The other lawyer can object that the lawyer is using his own words and not the witness' words if the written comments are too slanted. The court can permit the chart to be marked as an exhibit and to go with the jury into the jury room. See *Speier v. Webster College*, 616 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1981).

Revealing Pre-Prepared Aids to the Witness. An issue arises as to whether pre-prepared demonstrative aids, such as bullet charts or graphs, can be displayed to the jury while the witness is testifying but before the witness has authenticated all items, or before the witness has testified to all items. For example, assume the lawyer has a listing of eight points which he/she wants to make with the witness. Each point is listed separately, preceded by a bullet. Can the questioning lawyer put the entire chart up before the jury when he/she starts into the examination, or does he/she have to cover items with white tape and lift the tape off, item-by-item?

When a jury reads something, it is receiving it into evidence. Where the chart or diagram reflects extrinsic evidence, showing the chart or diagram to the jury before it has been marked and admitted into evidence is like passing out copies to the jury before the exhibit is marked and admitted. Strictly speaking, the jury should not read documentary evidence before it is marked and admitted. And if the document is not admitted, the jury should never read it.

Where the chart represents a *short-hand rendition* of the witness's testimony, and if a witness is going to provide testimony on all the points by the end of the examination, it would be harmless error, if error at all, for the trial court to permit the aid to be shown to the jury in advance of the testimony. However, a *leading question* objection might be proper if the witness can see the chart and is guided in his or her testimony by what's written on the chart.

Trial lawyers need to remember that the appellate record will not reflect that the jury is seeing demonstrative

evidence, unless that fact is announced in the presence of the court reporter who rights it down in his or her notes.

**XXXV. USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS.** In reliance upon the case of *Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co.*, 758 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied), lawyers used to go to extraordinary lengths to authenticate deposition excerpts for use in summary judgment motions or responses. Thankfully, this procedure was repudiated by the Supreme Court in *McConathy v. McConathy*, 869 S.W.2d 341, 341-42 (Tex. 1994), which declared that deposition excerpts submitted as summary judgment evidence do not have to be authenticated. The Supreme Court reasoned that "[a]ll parties have ready access to depositions taken in a cause, and thus deposition excerpts submitted with a motion for summary judgment may be easily verified as to their accuracy. Authentication is not necessary and is not required under the present rules." *Id.* at 342.

**XXXVI. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS.** Evidentiary objections, such as a hearsay objection, or lack of personal knowledge, etc. must be made in the summary judgment response or reply in order to stop the trial court and the appellate court from relying upon the inadmissible evidence in connection with the summary judgment. *Washington v. McMillan*, 898 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no writ); *Roberts v. Friendswood Dev. Co.*, 886 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); *Dolenz v. A.B.*, 742 S.W.2d 82, 83-84 n.2 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ denied). The trial court's ruling sustaining an objection to summary judgment evidence must be reduced to writing, filed, and included in the transcript, to be given effect on appeal. *Dolenz v. A.B.*, 742 S.W.2d 82, 83-84 n.2 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ denied). This can be done by having the trial court sign a written order ruling on the objection. Or by including a ruling on the objection in the summary judgment order. Or, if all else fails, you can use a formal bill of exception under new TRAP 33.2. Formal bills must be filed no later than 30 days after the filing party's notice of appeal is filed.

Further details can be obtained from: David Hittner & Lynne Liberato's book on *Summary Judgments and Defaults in the State Courts of Texas*, published by the Rutter Group; and Timothy Patton's book on *Summary Judgments in Texas*, published by Michie, Parker Publication Division, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

**XXXVII. LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.** In the new Texas Rules of Evidence, to become effective on March 1, 1998, the Texas Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals have altered the lawyer-client privilege in a significant way. Under former TRCE

503(a)(2), a representative of a client was "one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client." Added to that definition of a representative of a client is the following class of persons:

any other person who, for the purpose of effectuating legal representation for the client, makes or receives a confidential communication while acting in the scope of employment for the client.

New TRE 503(a)(2)(ii).

**XXXVIII. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE.** Confidential communications between a physician and a patient, relating to professional services rendered by the physician, are privileged. TRCE 50(b). To be confidential, the communication must not be intended for disclosure to third persons other than those present "to further the interest of the patient in consultation" or persons reasonably necessary for transmission of the message, or persons participating in diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician. *Id.* There are various exceptions to the rule, including instances when court or administrative proceedings are brought by the patient against the physician. It would seem from the language of the rule that only the patient's medical communications would become "unprivileged" in a medical malpractice case. This is not the case. In *Gustafson v. Chambers*, 871 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ), the appellate court held that where the patient alleged that the doctor was unfit to perform surgery due to alcohol and substance abuse, then the *defendant doctor's* own medical records were discoverable, since they were relevant to a claim or defense in the case. In *R.K. v. Ramirez*, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994), the Supreme Court endorsed this view of the exception to the doctor-patient privilege, saying that "the patient-litigant exception to the privileges applies when a party's condition relates in a significant way to a party's claim or defense." However, the Court stated that "[c]ommunications and records should not be subject to discovery if the patient's condition is merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue of fact, rather than an 'ultimate issue' for a claim or defense, or if the condition is merely tangential to a claim rather than 'central' to it." *Id.* at 842. In other words, before discovery is permitted, it is required "that the patient's condition, to be a 'part' of a claim or defense, must itself be a fact to which the substantive law assigns significance." *Id.* at 842. See the discussion of *Easter v. McDonald*, in the following paragraph.

It should be noted that in the new Texas Rules of Evidence, which became effective on March 1, 1998, the Supreme Court eliminated the parent-child relationship suit exception to the physician-patient privilege. However, the Supreme Court appended a new substantive comment to Rule 509, regarding the role of the

privilege in suits affecting the parent-child relationship [SAPCRs]. The comment reads:

Comment to 1998 change: This comment is intended to inform the construction and application of this rule. Prior Criminal Rules of Evidence 509 and 510 are now in subparagraph (b) of this Rule. This rule governs disclosures of patient-physician communications only in judicial or administrative proceedings. Whether a physician may or must disclose such communications in other circumstances is governed by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08. Former subparagraph (d)(6) of the Civil Evidence Rules, regarding disclosures in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, is omitted, not because there should be no exception to the privilege in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, but because the exception in such suits is properly considered under subparagraph (e)(4) of the new rule (formerly subparagraph (d)(4)), as construed in *R.K. v. Ramirez*, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994). In determining the proper application of an exception in such suits, the trial court must ensure that the precise need for the information is not outweighed by legitimate privacy interests protected by the privilege. Subparagraph (e) of the new rule does not except from the privilege information relating to a non-party patient who is or may be a consulting or testifying expert in the suit.

This new comment will have a significant impact on how the relevancy exception is applied to SAPCRs. Note that confidential medical records of an expert witness cannot be reached.

**XXXIX. MENTAL HEALTH PRIVILEGE.** Under TRCE 510, mental health information is privileged. One exception to the privilege is when the communications and records are "relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as a part of the party's claim or defense." TRCE 510(d)(5). See *R.K. v. Ramirez*, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994) [discussed in preceding paragraph], in a case involving the similarly-worded exception to the doctor-patient privilege.

In *Easter v. McDonald*, 903 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.--Waco 1995, orig. proceeding) (leave denied in Texas Supreme Court), the appellate court permitted a child to obtain mental health records of her step-father in a suit against a psychologist for negligence. The Court of Appeals read *R.K.* to hold that the privilege is overcome where the information relates to factual issues a jury would have to decide in answering jury questions. The Court of Appeals rejected the view that under *R.K.* discovery was permitted only where the privileged information involved the very questions to be submitted to the jury. *Id.* at 890.

It should be noted that in the new Texas Rules of Evidence, which became effective on March 1, 1998, the Supreme Court eliminated the parent-child relationship suit exception to the mental health privilege. However, the Court issued a comment, quoted in the preceding section, saying that the relevancy exception applies in SAPCRs, but that confidential mental health records of expert witnesses cannot be reached. When the trial court is asked to "ensure that the precise need for the information is not outweighed by legitimate privacy interests protected by the privilege," the court and counsel should examine *Jaffee v. Redmond*, 518 U.S. \_\_\_, 135 L.Ed.2d 337, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996), where the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized a federal common law mental health privilege. The Court described the legitimate privacy interests protected by the privilege in the following way:

Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.<sup>9</sup> As the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee observed in 1972 when it recommended that Congress recognize a psychotherapist privilege as part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, a psychiatrist's ability to help her patients

is completely dependent upon [the patients'] willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for [a psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure . . . patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general rule . . . , there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.

Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (quoting Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No. 45, Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry 92 (June 1960)). By pro-

protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient from involuntary disclosure, the proposed privilege thus serves important private interests. [Footnote omitted.]

*Jaffe v. Redmond*, 135 L.Ed.2d at 345.

**XL. PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE.** Confidential communication from a person to his/her clergyman in the latter's capacity as a spiritual adviser is privileged. TRCE 505. Thus, a minister could withhold the identity and communications by a church member who confessed negligence during a session in which the church member sought counselling and spiritual guidance from the minister. *Simpson v. Tennant*, 871 S.W.2d 301, 305-09 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

**XLI. REDACTING INADMISSIBLE PORTIONS OF EXHIBIT.** In some instances parts of a document are admissible while parts are not. According to one decision, when the trial court has ruled that a document can be admitted after certain information is redacted, the party offering the exhibit has the duty to be sure that the inadmissible portions are properly redacted. *American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. McInnis Book Store, Inc.*, 860 S.W.2d 484, 487-88 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); *Firo v. State*, 878 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.). However, the complaining party still has the burden to show that permitting the exhibit to go to the jury unredacted was reversible and not harmless error. *Id.* at 488.

**XLII. PRIOR CONVICTIONS.**

Prior notice. TRCE 609(f) provides that evidence of a conviction is not admissible if after timely written request the proponent fails to give the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence as will give the adverse party fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.

Only Felony and Misdemeanor of Moral Turpitude. TRCE 609(a) says only felonies and crimes of moral turpitude are admissible. TRCE 803(22) speaks only of proving up felonies.

Remoteness. A conviction is not admissible if the conviction or last incarceration was more than 10 years ago, unless the court determines in the interests of justice that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. TRCE 609(b); *Reveia v. Marine Drilling Co.*, 800 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).

Probation. Satisfactory completion of probation makes the conviction inadmissible, if there are no later convictions for felonies or crimes of moral turpitude. *Jackson v. Granite State Ins. Co.*, 685 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. 1985).

Juvenile Adjudications. Juvenile adjudications are not admissible, TRCE 609(d).

Appeal. Pendency of an appeal of a conviction renders the conviction inadmissible, TRCE 609(e).

Manner of Proof. A party can prove a prior conviction only by admission of the witness or by public record. TRCE 609.

**XLIII. MULTIPLE PARTY LAWSUITS.**

Make Your Own Objections. Each litigant must preserve error for himself or herself. One party cannot rely upon an objection asserted by another party as a basis for preserving error. *Wolfe v. East Texas Seed Co.*, 583 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dismissed). *But see Celotex Corp. v. Tate*, 797 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (trial court may in its discretion rule that one defendant's objection preserved error for all defendants).

Make Your Own Bill of Exceptions. Each party must rely upon his own bill of exceptions, and cannot rely upon the bill of exceptions of another party. *Howard v. Phillips*, 728 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1987, no writ). One party can, however, establish in the record that he or she adopts another party's bill, thereby preserving error.

Evidence Admitted Against Some But Not all Parties. TRCE 105, "Limited Admissibility," indicates that when evidence is admissible as to one party but not admissible as to another party, the court on proper request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. In the absence of such a limitation, no party can complain on appeal about the lack of limitation.

Practical Difficulties. It is relatively easy for a lawyer to object to exhibits which are not relevant as to his/her client, or that might be an admission of one party opponent but not of the lawyer's client. But how does the lawyer handle testimony that is inadmissible as to his/her client? Can you have a running objection to segments of, or all of, a witness's testimony, or is it necessary to constantly object and request a limiting instruction? Do you object during the opposing lawyer's closing argument, whenever he/she refers to evidence that was not admitted as to your client? How do you avoid trying the court's patience, and appearing to be obstructive in front of the jury?

**XLIV. ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT.** Settlement offers are not admissible on the issue of liability or damages. Likewise, conduct or statements made in negotiations is not admissible. TRCE 408. The rule does not require exclusion of evidence which can be obtained in another manner, merely because the matter was raised in compromise negotiations. *Id.* The evidence is not excludable where

offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a claim of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. *Id.* However, "[t]he exception for bias or prejudice or interest is a narrow one that refers to so-called "Mary Carter" agreements." *Rural Development, Inc. v. Stone*, 700 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Evidence whether Durham liked or disliked Stone may be a proper subject for consideration by the jury, but that evidence must come from some other source than conduct and statements at a meeting to attempt a settlement"). See *Barrett v. United States Brass Corp.*, 864 S.W.2d 606, 633-34 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), *rev'd on other grounds subnom, Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp.*, 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996) (defendant's settlement offers not admitted, even though offered as relevant to issue of mental anguish damages, unconscionability and plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages).

**XLV. NO MENTION OF LIABILITY INSURANCE.** It is improper to mention to the jury that the plaintiff or the defendant is or is not insured when that evidence has been kept from the jury. *Ford v. Carpenter*, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558, 559 (1949). TRCE 411 says:

Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another issue, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, if disputed, or bias or prejudice of a witness.

As to securing reversal on appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals made the following statement:

The mention of insurance before a jury is not always reversible error. *Dennis v. Hulse*, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962). The party appealing must show: (1) that the reference to insurance probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment in the case; and (2) that the probability that the mention of insurance caused harm exceeds the probability that the verdict was grounded on proper proceedings and evidence. *Id.*; *cf. Reviea v. Marine Drilling Co.*, 800 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. App. 1990, writ denied) (holding that no harm was shown when a prospective juror spontaneously brought up the issue of a party's insurance coverage). The logic behind the rule excluding evidence of liability insurance is that a jury is more likely to find against a party who is insured. *Pride Transp. Co. v. Hughes*, 591 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

In *University of Texas at Austin v. Hinton*, 822 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, no writ), members of the venire asked plaintiff's lawyer whether plaintiff was insured, and expressed concern that plaintiff might be "double-dipping" by recovering both from insurance and from the defendants. Plaintiff's counsel informed the panel that plaintiff was insured, but would have to reimburse the insurance company for its expenditures. Defendants objected. The appellate court ruled that while a party cannot inform the jury about the other party's insurance or lack of insurance, no rule of law prohibited a party from informing the jury about his/her own insurance.

In *Bleeker v. Villarreal*, 13-94-213-CV (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, reh. pending), plaintiffs sued a defendant as well as plaintiffs' own insurance company. The defendant wanted to offer evidence that the insurance company covered plaintiffs, and not defendant. The trial court's exclusion this evidence was not an abuse of discretion, and was deemed harmless anyway, since the defendant's counsel was permitted in voir dire to tell the panel that the insurance company covered the plaintiffs, and not the defendant.

**XLVI. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES.** TRCE 407(a) provides that remedial measures taken after an event (that is, measures that would have made the accident in question less likely to happen) are not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct. However, remedial measures can be admitted for other purposes, such as proving ownership, control, feasibility of precautionary measures (if controverted) or impeachment. *Keetch v. Kroger Co.*, 845 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990), *aff'd*, 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992). The Rule doesn't apply in products liability cases based on strict liability.

**XLVII. EVIDENCE OF OTHER INSTANCES.** The doctrine of *res inter alios acta* provides that each act or transaction sued on must be established by its own particular facts and circumstances. *State v. Buckner Construction Co.*, 704 S.W.2d 837, 848 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As stated in *Klorer v. Block*, 717 S.W.2d 754, 763 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.):

The general rule in Texas is that prior acts or transactions by one of the parties with other persons are irrelevant, immaterial and highly prejudicial and in violation of the rule that *res inter alios acta* are incompetent evidence, particularly in a civil case. *Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Baker*, 596 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The doctrine of "*res inter alios acta*" is based on the principle that each act or transaction sued on should be established by its own particular facts and circumstances, 23 TEX. JUR.2d EVIDENCE Sec. 187 (1961) (see cases cited).

However, an exception to this rule exists: a party's prior acts or transactions with other persons are admissible to show that party's intent where material, if they are so connected with the transaction at issue that they may all be parts of a system, scheme or plan. *See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baker*, 596 S.W.2d 639; 642-43 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Payne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, 409 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Cruze*, 191 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1945, no writ). *Accord, Underwriters Life Ins. Co., v. Cobb*, 746 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).

TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

This particular rule of evidence was discussed by Newell Blakely in *Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook*, 20 HOU. L. REV. 151, 200 (1983), when he said:

Rule 404(b) embodies the traditional Texas rule, which has been expressed as follows:

[W]hen it becomes necessary to decide whether or not a particular act was done with intent to defraud or with other evil intent proof of similar acts at or about the same time is admissible as circumstances tending to explain the motive with which the act under investigation was done.<sup>221</sup>

221. *Posey v. Hanson*, 196 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1917, no writ). *See also Bach v. Hudson*, 596 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (mental capacity); *Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker*, 596 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (intent); *Buhidar v. Abernathy*, 541 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mental capacity); *Payne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, 409 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plan); *Bridges v. Bridges*, 404 S.W.2d 48, 51-52 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1966, no writ) (knowledge).

The matter is also examined in 2 RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1521-22 (2nd ed. 1980). As to criminal evidence, in Section 1521 Professor Ray says:

[E]vidence which tends to prove the offense charged or any material fact in connection

therewith is admissible regardless of the fact that it also shows the commission of other crimes. In other words, where relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant's bad character, the admissibility of other offenses is not affected by their criminality. Other crimes may tend to show knowledge, design or intent. When relevant for either purpose they are not to be excluded because inadmissible to prove the accused's character. Of course there is danger, as there always is, where evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another, that the evidence will be misused by the jury and the accused found guilty because of his bad character. But this risk is one which must be run, guarded against as best it can be by the judge's charge. The principle of multiple admissibility must control.

*Id.* at 201-203. As to civil trials, in Section 1522 Professor Ray continues:

Wherever knowledge, intent or plan are relevant in a civil case the principles discussed in the preceding section apply with equal force. . . .

*Id.* at 211-212. *See also* Professor Ray's discussion of "Intention, Plan or Design" in Section 1533, and "Motive or Emotion" in Section 1534.

Also, TRCE 406 permits admission of a person's habit, or an organization's routine, to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.

Even where the evidence of other acts is relevant, the trial court can still exclude the evidence under TRCE 403, where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court of Criminal Appeals developed a 4-part balancing test, regarding the exclusion, under former TRCrimE 403, of otherwise admissible evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts: (1) the opponent must seriously contest the ultimate issue relating to the evidence; (2) the State must have a compelling need to the evidence to establish the ultimate issue; (3) the probative value of the extraneous offense must be compelling; and (4) a jury instruction to consider it for a limited purpose must likely be effective. *Montgomery v. State*, 810 S.W.2d 372, 392-93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The First Court of Appeals adopted this test for civil litigation in *McLellan v. Benson*, 877 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). However, the Austin Court of Appeals has declined to adopt this test for civil litigation, fearing that the stringency of the test--appropriate to criminal litigation--might require the exclusion of highly relevant evidence in many civil cases. *Porter v. Nemir*, 900 S.W.2d 376, 381 n. 6 (Tex.App.--Austin

1995, no writ). See *Schlueter v. Schlueter*, 929 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, writ granted) (Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that must be used sparingly).

See *Schlueter v. Schlueter*, 929 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, writ granted) (father's assisting one son in earlier divorce through illegal methods was admissible on question of motive and intent to commit fraud during other son's divorce, ten years later); *Johnson v. Houston*, 928 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (proper to exclude testimony of former co-worker that he had been fired in retaliation for filing a workers comp. claim; one instance does not rise to level of frequency and regularity necessary to be considered a routine practice under TRCE 406); *McLellan v. Benson*, 877 S.W.2d 454, 456-57 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (in case involving "date rape," it was not error to admit another instance of date rape on the issue of defendant's intent); *Waldon v. City of Longview*, 855 S.W.2d 875, 880 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1993, no writ) (proper to exclude evidence of three prior accidents in previous six years, since that did not constitute habit under TRCE 406). See also *Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp.*, 871 S.W.2d 263, 269-270 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, writ denied) (other incidents should not be excluded under TRCE 403 just because they are prejudicial; the prejudicial effect must substantially outweigh the relevance of the evidence). *Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Roberts*, 849 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1993, writ denied) (res inter alios acta subsumed into TRCE 401, 402, 403 & 404(b)). See also *Pena v. Neal, Inc.*, 901 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (driver's habit of stopping at convenience store to buy and drink alcohol, and clerk's habit of providing alcohol to driver, was admissible under TRCE 406 to prove that behavior on night of accident was in conformity with the habit); see generally *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Seale*, 904 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, writ dismissed) (similar accidents at other stores, while not admissible on defendant's knowledge of an unsafe condition, was admissible to establish expert's familiarity with shelving procedures in the industry).

**XLVIII. REPEATED OFFER OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.** The case of *Marling v. Maillard*, 826 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ), stands for the proposition that where evidence is admitted over objection, and the proponent later offers the same evidence again, the opponent must renew the original objection or the right to complain about the erroneous admission of the original testimony is waived. *Accord, Badger v. Symon*, 661 S.W.2d 164-65 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refused n.r.e.) (and cases cited therein); see also *Commercial Union Ins. v. La Villa Sch. D.*, 779 S.W.2d 102, 109-110 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (party cannot complain on appeal of improper admission of evidence where that party has introduced evidence of a similar character). The Texas Supreme Court has said

that where evidence is admitted over objection once in a trial, and the same evidence is later admitted without objection in the trial, that the admission of the evidence the second time renders harmless any error in the first admission of the evidence. *Richardson v. Green*, 677 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. 1984). To quote the Court:

The general rule is that error in the admission of testimony is deemed harmless if the objecting party subsequently permits the same or similar evidence to be introduced without objection.

On the other hand, Texas courts have held that in some circumstances, a party is not required to constantly repeat an objection. One such circumstance is when the objection would be futile because the court has just overruled a valid objection to the same testimony. *Graham v. State*, 710 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); *D.L.N. v. State*, 590 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1979, no writ).

In *Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht*, 878 S.W.2d 236, 242-43 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied), the court of appeals noted the two opposing lines of authority and said:

We conclude that the determination of whether a prior objection is sufficient to cover a subsequent offer of similar evidence depends upon a case-by-case analysis, based on such considerations as the proximity of the objection to the subsequent testimony, which party has solicited the subsequent testimony, the nature and similarity of the subsequent testimony as compared to the prior testimony and objection, whether the subsequent testimony has been elicited from the same witness, whether a running objection was requested or granted, and any other circumstances which might suggest why the objection should not have to be reurged.

**XLIX. RUNNING OBJECTIONS.** A "running objection" is a request to the court to permit a party to object to a line of questioning without the necessity of objecting to each individual question. Customarily this requires counsel obtaining permission from the court to have a "running objection" to all testimony from a particular witness on a particular subject.

The utility of a running objection has been recognized by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. *Ethington v. State*, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ("This Court has held on prior occasions that a continuing or running objection has properly preserved error"). In *Sattiewhite v. State*, 786 S.W.2d 271, 283-84 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), the Court stated:

In promulgating these rules [Rules of Appellate Procedure and specifically Rule 52(a) ], we took no "pot shots" at running objections because in certain situations they have a legitimate function.

A running objection, in some instances, will actually promote the orderly progression of the trial. When an attorney has an objection to a line of testimony from a witness, it is often disruptive for the trial judge to force him to make the same objection after each question of opposing counsel just so that the attorney can receive the same ruling from the trial judge to preserve error. As long as Rule 52 is satisfied, that is, as long as the running objection constituted a timely objection, stating the specific grounds for the ruling, the movement desired the court to make (if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context of the running objection) then the error should be deemed preserved by an appellate court.

In *Commerce, Crowdus & Canton, Ltd. v. DKS Const., Inc.*, 776 S.W.2d 615, 620-21 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ), the court said the following about running objections:

In considering the effectiveness of a running objection, it is widely considered that a party making a proper objection to the introduction of testimony of a witness, which objection is overruled, may assume that the judge will make a similar ruling as to other offers of similar evidence and is not required to repeat the objection. See *Bunnett/Smallwood & Co. v. Helton Oil Co.*, 577 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1979, no writ); *Crispi v. Emmott*, 337 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston 1960, no writ). Some courts, though, have held that a running objection is primarily limited to those instances where the similar evidence is elicited from the same witness. See *City of Fort Worth v. Holland*, 748 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); *City of Houston v. Riggins*, 568 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In these cases, however, the trial was to the jury. In our case, the trial was to the court. We hold that a running objection is an effective objection to all evidence sought to be excluded where trial is to the court and an objection is clearly made to the judge. Therefore, appellant's running objection to any evidence admitted for the purpose of proving alter-ego was an effective objection, and the issue was not tried by consent.

It is important that the basis for the running objection be clearly stated in the statement of facts. See *Anderson Development Co., Inc. v. Producers Grain Corp.*, 558 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("The same objection on that question" and a 'running objection' are general objections where several objections have been made"). And it is necessary that the request and granting of a running objection be reflected in the statement of facts. See *Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, Inc.*, 776 S.W.2d 212, 217-18 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).

**L. MOTION IN LIMINE VS. RULING OUTSIDE PRESENCE OF JURY.**

The Motion in Limine. Appellate cases have made it clear that the denial of a motion in limine is not itself reversible error. See *Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. McCardell*, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963). There the Supreme Court said:

If a motion in limine is overruled, a judgment will not be reversed unless the questions or evidence were in fact asked or offered. If they were in fact asked or offered, an objection made at that time is necessary to preserve the right to complain on appeal . . . .

*Id.* at 335. Nor can the granting of a motion in limine be claimed as error on appeal. *Keene Corp. v. Kirk*, 870 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, no writ) (after motion in limine was sustained as to certain evidence, counsel conducted the balance of his examination of the witness without ever eliciting the excluded evidence; error was therefore waived); *Waldon v. City of Longview*, 855 S.W.2d 875, 880 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1993, no writ) (fact that motion in limine was sustained, and proponent offered exhibit on informal bill of exceptions, did not preserve error, since it was incumbent upon the proponent to tender the evidence offered in the bill and secure a ruling on its admission).

If a motion in limine is granted and the evidence is nonetheless offered, or argument of counsel made, in violation of the order in limine, an objection to the offending evidence or argument is prerequisite to raising a complaint on appeal at the violation of the order. If the objection is sustained, then the aggrieved party should move that the jury be instructed to disregard the improper evidence or argument. If the instruction is denied, complaint can be premised on the denial. If the instruction is granted, it will cure harm, except for incurable argument, such as an appeal to racial prejudice. In criminal cases, the aggrieved party who timely objects and receives a curative instruction, but who is still not satisfied, must push further and secure an adverse ruling on a motion for a mistrial, in order to preserve appellate complaint. Immediately pushing for a mistrial should not be necessary in a civil proceeding, for the following reason. If the harm is curable, then by necessity a curative instruction will cure the harm. If the harm is incurable, then an instruction will not cure the harm, and the only relief is a new trial. However, a new trial is not necessary if the aggrieved party wins. Judicial economy suggests that the aggrieved party should be able to raise incurable error after the results of the trial are known, rather than having civil litigants moving for mistrial in a case that they otherwise might have won. TRCP 324(b)(5) specifically permits incurable jury argument to be raised by motion for new trial, even if it was not objected to at the time the argument was made. See generally *In re W.G.W.*, 812 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)

(insinuation that cervical cancer was caused by immoral conduct was incurable error). Counsel's violation of a motion in limine exposes the lawyer to a contempt citation.

**Ruling Outside Presence of Jury.** TRCE 103(b) provides that "[w]hen the court hears objections to offered evidence out of the presence of the jury and rules that such evidence be admitted, such objections shall be deemed to apply to such evidence when it is admitted before the jury without the necessity of repeating those objections." If the objection is made in connection with presenting a motion in limine, does Rule 103(b) obviate the need to object in the presence of the jury?

This question was considered in *Rawlings v. State*, 874 S.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1994, no pet.). In determining whether counsel's objection was a motion in limine or an objection outside the presence of a jury, the appellate court disregarded the label used by counsel and the trial judge, and looked instead to the substance of the objection or motion. The court made the following observations:

[A] motion in limine characteristically includes: (1) an objection to a general category of evidence; and (2) a request for an instruction that the proponent of that evidence approach the bench for a hearing on its admissibility before offering it. Conspicuously absent from a motion in limine is a request for a ruling on the actual admissibility of specific evidence.

In contrast, Rule 52(b) seems to require both specific objections and a ruling on the admissibility of contested evidence. In fact, we question whether Rule 52(b) comes into play until specific evidence is actually offered for admission. Rule 52(b) only provides that complaints about the admission of evidence are preserved when the court hears objections to offered evidence and rules that such evidence shall be admitted.

The court concluded that in that case the request was a motion in limine that did not preserve error.

*See K-Mart No. 4195 v. Judge*, 515 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1974, writ dismissed) (even if trial objection was seen as incorporating objections set out in motion in limine, still the objection was a general objection). Restating the objection made outside the presence of the jury was held not to be necessary in *Klekar v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.*, 874 S.W.2d 818, 824-25 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).

**LI. TIMELINESS OF OBJECTIONS.** In order to complain on appeal about wrongful admission of evidence, the complaining party must make a timely objection or motion to strike the evidence, stating the

specific ground of objection if not apparent from the context. TRCE 103(a)(10). The complaining party must also show that the trial court ruled on the request or refused to rule on the request and that the refusal was objected to. New TRAP 33.1(a)(2).

Generally, timely means immediately. *See Beall v. Ditmore*, 867 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, writ denied) (if reasonably obvious that the question calls for inadmissible evidence, objection must be made before witness answers). However, in *Beall*, trial counsel delayed slightly. The plaintiff was asked why he sued for \$ 500,000.00 dollars. The plaintiff said because "that's what your policy stated." Counsel immediately switched the subject, asking one more question, and then approached the bench and moved for a mistrial. A majority of the appellate panel held that trial counsel was trying to avoid drawing the jury's attention to mention of insurance, by switching the subject and then approaching the bench, and so held that the objection was timely.

In another case, a party moved in limine to preclude a document, but the motion was overruled. When the document was offered during trial, the opposing party did not recognize it, and indicated no objection. Before the jury learned of the document's contents, the opposing party realized his error, and objected, and asked the court to find that the objection was made before the jury learned of the contents of the document. The court of appeals held that objection was waived, but the Supreme Court appears to have disagreed with that holding. *Larson v. Cactus Utility Co.*, 730 S.W.2d 640, 641-42 (Tex. 1987).

In *Keene Corp. v. Rogers*, 863 S.W.2d 168, 178 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, no writ), the trial court admitted an exhibit, but then permitted a party to make an objection to the exhibit, and the objection was treated by the appellate court as timely.

**LII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXPERTS. Locality Rule.** Texas has traditionally recognized a "locality rule" in malpractice cases. Generally stated, a plaintiff seeking to hold a physician liable for negligence at common law must prove expert testimony that the defendant failed to act as a reasonable and prudent physician practicing in the same or similar community would have acted. *Hickson v. Martinez*, 707 S.W.2d 919, 925 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985), writ refused *n.r.e. per curiam*, 716 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1986). This allows local physicians to set the standards against which their conduct will be measured in malpractice cases. *Greene v. Thiet*, 846 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1992, writ denied). However, that rule has been altered by statute in some instances. *Id.*, at 30-31 (in suits against physicians for failure to disclose risks of medical procedure, the locality rule has been displaced by the "reasonable person" rule of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 6.02, which focuses on the

disclosures which would influence a reasonable person in deciding for or against medical treatment). This statutory standard focuses on the patient, whereas the common law rule focuses on the doctor. *Price v. Hurt*, 711 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, no writ).

In *Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp.*, 747 S.W.2d 361, 366 (Tex. 1987), the Supreme Court said:

The purpose of the locality rule is to prevent unrealistic comparisons between the standards of practice in communities where resources and facilities might vastly differ.

The Court found that instructing the jury that negligence required comparison of a physician acting in the "same or similar circumstances" adequately set out the locality rule.

When an expert is testifying to negligence, it is not necessary to couch the opinion in terms of the locality of the defendant. *Wheeler v. Aldama-Luebbert*, 707 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (although the standard of care used by the expert is not defined in terms of "locality" or "same school," it exemplified the modern trend away from such defined standard of care). And out-of-state experts can testify to negligence. *Goodwin v. Camp*, 852 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1993, no writ) (permissible for out-of-state chiropractor to testify to negligence); *Hart v. Van Zandt*, 399 S.W.2d 791, 798 (Tex. 1965) (trial court erred in excluding the deposition testimony of a Pennsylvania medical doctor); *Johnson v. Hermann Hosp.*, 659 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Doctors are no longer required to be from the same city, state, or school of practice in order to testify so long as they are equally familiar with the subject of inquiry . . .").

**Reasonable Medical Probability.** A medical expert's opinion must be based on reasonable medical probability whether it is or not is to be determined by substance and context of the opinion, not by the presence or absence of a particular term or phrase. *Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye*, 907 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1995).

**Requires Expertise Regarding Specific Issue.** In *Brodgers v. Heise*, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996), the Supreme Court held that an medical malpractice expert had to have "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" regarding the specific issue before the court, in order to give expert opinion testimony. In *Brodgers*, it was held proper to exclude the testimony of an emergency room physician that calling in a neurosurgeon would have saved the patient's life. The Supreme Court recognized that when "a subject is substantially developed in more than one field, testimony can come from a qualified expert in any of those fields." *Id.* at 154. A plaintiff successfully overcame a motion for

summary judgment, by using an affidavit from an orthopedic surgeon saying that a radiologist committed negligence, in *Silvas v. Ghiatas*, 954 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, writ denied). The court of appeals characterized the Supreme Court's holding in *Brodgers* as follows:

As our Texas Supreme Court recently held, the plaintiff's controverting expert need not be a specialist in the particular area in which the defendant-physician practices so long as his affidavit demonstrates that by virtue of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court, his testimony would assist the jury in determining the fact issues of negligence and/or causation.

*Silvas v. Ghiatas*, p. 3.

**LIII. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.** In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a valid written instrument. *Kelley v. Martin*, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986) (re: will); *Knox v. Long*, 257 S.W.2d 289, 296-297 (1953) (re: deed); *Alamo Bank of Texas v. Palacios*, 804 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (re: promissory note); McClung, *A Primer on the Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence of Contract Meaning*, 49 TEX.B.J. 703 (1986). See *Gannon v. Baker*, 818 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1991) (corporate minutes did not, under these circumstances, constitute a written agreement precluding parol evidence). See *Litton v. Hanley*, 823 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (judgment from jury trial reversed where trial court improperly admitted parol evidence which contradicted a promissory note).

**LIV. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS.** A judicial admission is a statement by a party usually found in a pleading or stipulation that accesses to the level of formal waiver of proof of the facts stated. *Dobbins v. Coruthers*, 864 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). A judicial admission relieves the opposing party from having to prove the admitted fact and precludes the party making the admission from introducing contrary evidence. *Clements v. Corbin*, 891 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).

**Live Pleadings.** Statements in pleadings constitute judicial admissions. *Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc.*, 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1980). Assertions of fact in live pleadings are formal judicial admissions upon which a summary judgment may be rendered. *Manahan v. Meyer*, 862 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). The rule does not apply to statements made "in the alternative." *Manahan v. Meyer*, 862 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. App.--Hous. [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

Requested Admissions. *Gonzales v. Surplus Ins. Services*, 863 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993, writ denied) ("[Requested admissions, once deemed admitted, are judicial admissions and appellant may not then introduce controverting testimony in any legal proceeding related to the instant action").

Inventory and Appraisal in Divorce. A sworn inventory and appraisal filed in divorce case can constitute judicial admission, even when not marked and offered as evidence. *Vannerson v. Vannerson*, 857 S.W.2d 659, 670-71 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); *Roosevelt v. Roosevelt*, 699 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1985, writ dismissed). *Contra*, *Tschirhart v. Tschirhart*, 876 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ); *Poulter v. Poulter*, 565 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1978, no writ); *Bokhoven v. Bokhoven*, 559 S.W.2d 142, 143-44 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1977, no writ).

Opening Argument. In *Vanscot Concrete Co. v. Bailey*, 862 S.W.2d 781, (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, no writ), the court held that certain statements made by opposing counsel during opening argument were not judicial admissions.

Party's Testimony is Not. As a general rule, a party's testimony is not considered to be a judicial admission. *Thomas v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co.*, 860 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993) ("Texas generally follows the rule that a party's testimony must be regarded as evidence, not as an admission"), *judgment vacated without reference to merits*, 866 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1993). In some instances, however, a party's testimony will operate as a judicial admission. *Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., Inc.*, 858 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1993) ("The requirements for treating a party's testimonial quasi-admission as a conclusive judicial admission include that the statement be "deliberate, clear, and unequivocal" and that "[t]he hypothesis of mere mistake or slip of the tongue must be eliminated").

Distinguish From Judicial Estoppel. The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that when a party to a lawsuit has successfully taken a position under oath in a prior proceeding, he is estopped from taking a contrary position in a subsequent proceeding. *Long v. Knox*, 291 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1956). The party can escape the rule upon a showing of inadvertence, mistake, fraud or duress. *Id.*

**LV. OFFER OF PROOF OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.** If the trial court excludes tendered evidence, the party who wishes to complain on appeal about the exclusion must make an offer of proof, so that the statement of facts reflects the evidence that was excluded. TRCE 103(a)(2). The offering party must make its offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, as soon as practical, but in any event *before the court's charge is read to the jury*. TRCE 103(b). The trial court can

add any other or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. The offer can be in the form of counsel summarizing the proposed evidence in a concise statement, but at the request of a party the offer must be in question and answer form. TRCE 103(b). No further offer need be made. *Mosley v. Employer Cas. Co.*, 873 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, writ granted) (in order to complain on appeal about the refusal to admit evidence, the proponent must make an offer of proof or bill of exceptions to give the appellate court something to review); *Palmer v. Miller Brewing Co.*, 852 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (party complaining that trial court would not permit a party to pose a particular question on cross-examination failed to preserve error, because the proponent did not elicit from the witness, on bill of exception, what his answer to the question would have been).

**LVI. JUDICIAL NOTICE.** A court may take judicial notice on its own motion. A party who requests judicial notice should supply the court with necessary information. The opposing party is entitled to be heard on opposing the taking of judicial notice. Upon taking judicial notice, the Court should instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. TRCE 201: "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

*Tschirhart v. Tschirhart*, 876 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ) (trial court cannot take judicial notice of sworn inventory and appraisal prepared by spouse in connection with divorce; inventory must be offered and received into evidence to be considered by the fact finder); *Wright v. Wright*, 867 S.W.2d 807, 816-17 n. 6 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, writ denied) (court of appeals took judicial notice of fact that San Antonio is 335 miles from Odessa); *Fields v. City of Texas City*, 864 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (upon request, appellate court can take judicial notice of city charter provisions).

**LVII. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S NET WORTH.** In *Lunsford v. Morris*, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex. 1988), the Texas Supreme Court changed prior Texas law and held that in cases in which punitive damages may be awarded, parties may discover and offer evidence of a defendant's net worth. This was because the amount of punitive damages necessary to punish and deter wrongful conduct depends on the financial strength of the defendant. In *Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel*, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994), the Supreme Court expressed a concern that "evidence of a defendant's net worth, which is generally relevant only to the amount of punitive damages, by highlighting the

relative wealth of a defendant, has a very real potential for prejudicing the jury's determination of other disputed issues in a tort case." *Id.* at 30. The Supreme Court therefore held that, upon timely motion, the trial court should bifurcate the determination of the amount of punitive damages from the remaining issues. That way the jury would first hear evidence relevant to liability for actual damages, the amount of actual damages, and liability for punitive damages, and then return findings on those issues. If the jury finds the basis for punitive damages, then the jury would hear evidence only to the amount of punitive damages, considering the "totality of the evidence presented at both phases of the trial." *Id.* at 30. The Rule became statutory in 1995, in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009 (Vernon 1997).

**LVIII. RECOVERED MEMORY.** Courts are increasingly faced with testimony of witnesses about their recollection of events that has been enhanced or "recovered" through hypnosis. An article in *The National Law Journal* p. A10 (10-30-95) discusses a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) on the subject. In *Borawick v. Shay*, 68 F.3d 597 (2nd Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, 116 S. Ct. 1869, 134 L.Ed.3d 966 (1996), the court held that it was not error to exclude "recovered memory" testimony of a 38-year old woman regarding her recollection of being sexually abused 30 years before by her aunt and uncle. The court considered the hypnotherapist's lack of qualifications, and failure to keep audiotapes or videotapes that could demonstrate whether the hypnotherapist had been suggestive in his approach. The Court adopted a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach, as had the Eighth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Texas Supreme Court recently considered the "recovered memory" technique in connection with the discovery rule, in *S.V. v. R.V.*, 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996). In that case, the majority of the Court held that the discovery rule did not apply to allegedly recovered memories of childhood sex abuse, because expert opinions, and the victim's testimony based upon recovered memory, were not objectively verifiable. Justice Gonzalez concurred, saying that the expert testimony regarding repressed memories did not meet the guidelines for admissibility of scientific expert opinions set out in *DuPont v. Robinson*. Justice Cornyn, in his concurring opinion, agreed with Justice Gonzalez, saying that *Robinson* will result in the exclusion of all uncorroborated repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse.

**LIX. BATSON CHALLENGES IN CIVIL CASES.** In the case of *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 80 (1986), the Supreme Court held that purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of a jury denied a defendant's right to equal protection of the law.

In *Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.*, 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the Supreme Court announced that its holding in the

criminal law area would be extended to civil trials. The rule was recognized for Texas civil proceedings in *Powers v. Palacios*, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991). In entertaining such a challenge, civil courts are instructed follow the "same approach" utilized in evaluating a Batson challenge in a criminal context." *See Id.* 111 S.Ct. at 2088-89. *See American Chrome & Chemicals, Inc. v. Benavides*, 907 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam denial of application for writ of error) (rejecting idea that Supreme Court has gone "a step beyond" other jurisdictions).

More recently, the Supreme Court extended the *Batson* rationale to the exclusion of jurors based upon gender. *J.E.B. v. Alabama*, 511 U.S. \_\_\_, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). *See* Cutler, *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Excellent Ideology, Ineffective Implementation*, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503 (1995) (predicting that further extension of the equal rights rationale to other groups will lead to the eventual demise of the peremptory challenge system). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals initially extended the ruling to strikes based on religion, in *Casarez v. State*, No. 1114-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (withdrawn), but an intervening election brought two new members to the Court and the ruling changed, so that by a 5-4 vote religion can be considered in exercising peremptory challenges. [1994 WL 695868] According to an article in the Nov. 28, 1994 *National Law Journal*, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled on Nov. 10, 1994, that it was improper for prosecutors to strike persons with Irish or Italian names, in order to keep Catholics off of the jury, in a criminal prosecution against a Catholic priest for blockading an abortion clinic. [The defendant's attorney was Thomas Finnerty; the priest was Rev. Carleton.]

In *Purkett v. Elem*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), a robbery case, the Supreme Court found no constitutional problem with a prosecutor's explanation for striking a black juror that the juror had long, unkempt hair, and his mustache and goatee looked suspicious.

**LX. JUROR NOTE-TAKING.** In *Price v. State*, 887 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), the Court of Criminal Appeals, by vote of 6-3, approved juror's taking notes in criminal trials. The majority noted that "the vast majority of states and most of the federal circuits hold that jurors may take notes subject to the trial court's discretion." *Id.* at 952-53. The Court set out a four-pronged test for judges to use: (1) whether note-taking would help jurors in light of the issues and expected length of the trial; (2) the judge should tell the parties before voir dire that note-taking will be allowed; (3) the judge should give the jury a detailed admonishment when the jury is empaneled; (4) the judge should give the jury instructions in the charge prohibiting the use of notes during deliberation to resolve disputes over the evidence.

**LXI. JURORS ASKING QUESTIONS.** In *Morrison v. State*, 845 S.W.2d 882, 887-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (a 5-4 decision), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial judge cannot permit jurors to ask questions in a criminal trial. In doing so, the court overruled several court of appeals decisions, and deviated from some federal case law. See *Jurors Questioning Witnesses in Federal Court*, Anno., 80 A.L.R.Fed.892 (1986). *Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court During Course of Trial*, Anno., 31 A.L.R.3d872 (1970); Michel, *Should Jurors Be Allowed to Pose Written Questions to Witnesses During a Trial?*, 55 TEX. B.J. 1020 (November 1992).

Can jurors ask questions in civil cases?

The following procedure was suggested by Judge Campbell, on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, as a safe way to permit juror questioning:

In my view, trial courts should have the discretion to allow juror questioning provided they follow these safeguards to protect the adversary process:

First, the trial judge should notify counsel before trial that she intends to allow juror questions. Such pre-trial warnings would enable counsel to modify their trial strategies, if need be, to accommodate the innovation.

Second, the trial judge should inform the jurors before trial that, although their primary duty is to decide the facts from the evidence presented by counsel, they will have a limited right to ask questions. The trial judge should also explain the overall procedure involved.

Third, the court should allow the juror interrogation immediately after both counsel have examined a witness, while the jurors' questions are still fresh in their minds and the witness is still available.

Fourth, the juror questions should be kept relatively few in number but otherwise limited only by the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.

Fifth, the questions should be submitted in writing to the trial judge, who should prohibit, sua sponte, clearly improper questions.

Sixth, counsel should be able to object to any question, and get a ruling on the objection, outside the hearing of the jury. (FN1)

Seventh, when the judge rejects a juror's question, she should briefly but carefully explain the rejection to the jury. Such an explanation will help prevent speculation by the jury both as to the reasons for the rejection and the forbidden answer.

Eighth, if the judge accepts the question, she should ask it of the witness herself.

Ninth, after the jury interrogation, counsel should have the opportunity to re-examine the witness via the usual procedure for direct and cross-examination. The re-examination should be restricted to the scope of the subject matter of the jurors' questions.

*Morrison v. State*, 845 S.W.2d at 900-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Campbell, J., joined by McCormick, P.J., and White, J., dissenting).

An article by Gordon Hunter in the September 26, 1994, edition of *Texas Lawyer*, page 36, titled "In the People's Court, Jurors Ask Some Off-Beat Questions," discussed guidelines used by Judge John Delaney in the 95th District Court of Dallas County, in connection with juror questions. The guidelines are available on Lexis Counsel Connect, under the CHANNELS menu. Here are Judge Delaney's guidelines.

#### JURORS ASKING QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES

1. Judge explains the process to trial attorneys before voir dire (by copy of this handout or orally or both), answers any questions about the process, and assures the attorneys that they will be given opportunities to make objections to the process as well as any juror questions, both outside the presence of the jury.
2. During voir dire examination the Judge explains the process in general terms, reserving detailed instructions for after the jury is seated and sworn.
3. During preliminary instructions to the impaneled jury, the judge explains the process in detail, including the content of the following items. This can be done orally because it will be in the Statement of Facts in the event of an appeal.
4. Judge emphasizes to jurors that they are not required, expected, or necessarily encouraged to ask questions, but that the opportunity will be available to them.
5. Judge explains that juror questions may have to be excluded for legal reasons, the same as if they'd been asked by an attorney. That is, some questions are not permitted in a trial because of the Rules of Evidence that must be followed no matter who asks the question. The Judge may wish to expand on this point, to put jurors at ease, by saying they should not be intimidated by the possibility their question will violate some rule of evidence that no one expects them to know; that they should feel free to ask their question and leave its admissibility up to the Judge; but that they should not speculate on why their question was not allowed if it is not. The jury should be instructed not to discuss among

themselves any question submitted by a juror, except that any question that actually is asked of a witness becomes part of the evidence in the trial and is appropriate for discussion after deliberations begin.

6. Judge informs the jurors that he cannot rephrase their questions to put them in a format for reading to the witness, so jurors should submit them in the exact form they expect them to be read to the witness. E.g., jurors should write out "What did you do..." instead of "Ask him about what he did...."

7. After each witness is examined by all attorneys, jurors are given a chance to submit questions before that witness is excused.

8. The Judge asks jurors for a show of hands to indicate if there are any jury questions, e.g., "are there any questions from the jury?"

9. Jurors write out any questions on a sheet from their note pad and hand them up through the bailiff. As many questions as any juror has may be written on one or more pages.

10. Before there is any discussion or reading of the questions, the jury is sent to the jury room. The witness (if not a party) is also sent out of the room.

11. With the jury out, the Judge and attorneys review submitted questions, which are read into the record by the Judge.\* The attorneys may examine the written questions if they wish, but in practice it has been rare that they see the need. The attorneys make any objections while the jury is out. The Judge rules on the propriety of the questions, based on the normal rules of evidence, and may choose to exclude some if they appear to be adversarial in nature. Experience has shown that they almost never are.

12. With the jury back in the jury box, and the witness on the stand, the Judge reads each question to the witness, followed by the witness, answer. If the juror appears confused by any question, the Judge may offer to read it again. The Judge should decline to answer any question from the witness that asks the Judge to interpret the meaning of the question, but should instruct the witness to answer as best he can. The attorneys may make any objection to the form or content of the answer (e.g., narrative, includes hearsay, etc.).

13. After all jury questions have been answered by the witness, the attorneys may ask follow up questions relating to the juror questions, beginning with the sponsoring attorney.

14. The witness is then excused without further questions from the jurors.

\*One commentator on this procedure has suggested that the juror questions should be preserved and marked as Court or appellate exhibits to be included in the trial record. This seems unnecessary, given that each question that is asked of a witness has been taken down in the Statement of Facts at least twice.

The Arizona Supreme Court adopted rules on October 24, 1995, permitting jurors to submit written questions in civil and criminal trials. The Civil Rule reads:

Jurors shall be permitted to submit to the court written questions directed to witnesses or to the court. Opportunity shall be given to counsel to object to such questions out of the presence of the jury. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for good cause the court may prohibit or limit the submission of questions to witnesses.

ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10). See similar criminal rule, ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e).